Fridge Controller Attacks: Researchers Find Six Zero-Days in an Hour
Fridge Controller Attacks: Researchers Find Six Zero-Days in an Hour 2026-11-17 14:41:36 Author: securityaffairs.com(查看原文) 阅读量:5 收藏

Fridge Controller Attacks: Researchers Find Six Zero-Days in an Hour

Pierluigi Paganini November 17, 2026

Midnight Blue found six unpatched remote takeover flaws in Danfoss AK-SM800A controllers in under an hour. Agencies agree: take them off the internet.

Since 11 October, attackers have been hitting internet-exposed fridge controllers from Danfoss and Copeland across Europe, starting in France. They triggered defrost cycles, spoiled food worth tens of millions of euros and caused fires in some cases. SentinelOne warns that attribution is open, and analysts shouldn’t assume one actor behind every incident.

Now cybersecurity firm Midnight Blue says one of those controllers is in worse shape than anyone assumed.

“Midnight Blue researcher Carlo Meijer found several pre-authentication remote code execution 0-day vulnerabilities in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A in less than an hour with casual manual inspection.” reads the analysis pubòished by Midnight .

Researcher Carlo Meijer found six pre-authentication remote code execution zero-days in the Danfoss AK-SM800A in less than an hour of manual review, using firmware anyone can download from Danfoss’s site. Every version up to and including 5.3.2 is affected, and there are no CVE numbers yet because coordinated disclosure with Danfoss is still running.

All six flaws are stack-based buffer overflows. Five can be exploited remotely without logging in because they affect web services on the controller. The main application also runs with root privileges and lacks basic security protections, making exploitation more dangerous.

Danfoss Strict mode adds HTTPS and session checks, blocking most unauthenticated attacks. However, the sixth flaw affects the component that enforces this protection. Researchers found that it can crash the service and may allow code execution with further work.

An attacker who gains root access could change controller settings, trigger defrost cycles, hide activity from logs, or install malware that survives factory resets and firmware updates. They could even erase the device’s memory and make it unusable. This could leave refrigeration systems offline for days.

All six are stack-based buffer overflows. Five sit in web request handlers that need no login, inside sm_app, a large program that handles almost everything on the device. It uses hundreds of unchecked strcpy calls, has no stack canaries and no PIE.

“Of course, remotely triggering a crash is bad in itself, but being able to leverage the buffer overflow to obtain remote code execution is much worse. Any reasonably experienced exploit developer will agree exploiting straightforward stack-based buffer overflows on ARM Linux without exploit mitigations is very straightforward. And if they don’t, there’s probably a frontier or open weight model out there willing to help them agree.” continues the report. “The only challenge (if you can call it that) left to overcome is the fact that strcpy() stops copying bytes when it hits a null byte. If we wish to gain remote code execution, we inevitably need to write several addresses containing null bytes. Thus, we need to somehow overcome this inherent limitation of strcpy() and while we won’t share our approach for now it’s not exactly rocket surgery. Also, the exploited application runs as root (because of course it does).”

Danfoss’s Strict mode, the default since version 4.0, requires HTTPS and session tokens and closes most of the unauthenticated surface. That’s why CERT-FR recommended it. The sixth flaw sits in sm_fcgi_app, the gateway that enforces Strict mode, so in an emulator with Strict mode on it crashed, and with more work the researchers say it can become code execution.

The damage could go beyond another defrost cycle. The controllers don’t use secure boot, so an attacker with root could change settings, start defrosts, hide it from the logs and plant code that survives a factory reset and a firmware update. They could also wipe the flash and make a controller unusable until someone replaces it. That could leave freezers unavailable for days.

Nobody has shown this in the wild. Germany’s BSI says they are no aware of attacks in the wild exploiting one of these six flaws, and neither agencies nor researchers link them to the autumn incidents. Earlier AK-SM800A bugs were already documented in 2023 and 2025, and public exploits for them appeared within 48 hours of the French attacks, before the second wave on 2 November.

There’s no patch. The researchers say version 5.4.0 doesn’t fix the flaws, since the firmware was likely built on 29 October, before the second wave and before their reports. The BSI first said 5.4.0 wasn’t affected, then corrected itself and said it can’t rule that out. Danfoss told trade press on 12 October that most units hit in France were older models or ran outdated firmware.

Exposure is still large. Censys shows hundreds of Danfoss systems online, though some are surely honeypots, plus over 1,000 Copeland and Dixell controllers and hundreds from similar vendors like Eliwell that haven’t been targeted yet. Danfoss business units hold IEC 62443-4-1 certification for secure development, and Midnight Blue says asset owners should see how little such certificates say about a product. The certificate says secure development, while the compiler flags say otherwise.

Midnight Blue says that applying individual patches and relying on Strict mode are not enough. It recommends reducing internet exposure instead. Owners should identify every controller accessible online, including those connected through an integrator’s 4G modem, and restrict remote access to VPNs, private networks or strict firewall rules. Broad geographic restrictions and blacklists are not sufficient.

Belgian and Irish agencies also advise checking controller settings for unauthorized changes, including temperature levels, defrost schedules, alarms, user accounts and remote access. If a compromise is suspected, the BSI recommends changing all passwords and checking that connected equipment still works properly.

However, owners should not simply disconnect their refrigeration service providers. They should first review contracts and insurance requirements and establish secure remote access so that monitoring and maintenance can continue.

The report conludes with the following mitigations:

“Instead, we strongly recommend asset owners and system integrators to take the following course of action for all Danfoss, Copeland, and Dixell controllers and preferably for similar controllers by other vendors as well:

  • Ensure controller management interfaces are only accessible through either a VPN, a private APN, or highly restrictive firewall-enforced IP whitelist (broad IP geofencing or blacklisting is not sufficient). As per CERT-FR recommendations, IP whitelisting is an intermediate mitigation and not long-term sustainable due to the risk of configuration drift and change management challenges.”
  • Inventarise which controllers are internet exposed, not just on asset owner public IP ranges but also through system integrator 4G modems

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Fridge Controller)




文章来源: https://securityaffairs.com/203324/security/fridge-controller-attacks-researchers-find-six-zero-days-in-an-hour.html
如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh