Identity is where we see attackers start, almost every time. In CI environments, identity bridges enterprise IT and operational technology, making it the primary attack path. More than 97% of identity-based attacks target password-based authentication, most commonly through password spray or brute force techniques. As identity systems centralize access to cloud and operational assets, adversaries rely on LOTL techniques and legitimate credentials to evade detection. Because identity now governs access across these connected domains, a single compromised account can provide privileged reach into operationally relevant systems.
 

The cloud did not just change how CI organizations operate. It changed how attackers get in and how far they can go. Cloud and hybrid incidents increased 26% in early 2025 as identity, automation, and remote management converged within cloud control planes. Microsoft research shows 18% of intrusions originate from web-facing assets, 12% from exposed remote services, and 3% from supply chain pathways. As long-lived OT systems depend on cloud-based identity and centralized remote access, identity compromise can extend beyond IT into operational environments. Incidents that once remained contained within IT environments can now extend directly into operational systems. For CI operators, this means cloud and hybrid architecture now directly influence operational resilience—not just IT security.
 

This is the one that keeps me up at night. Nation-state operators are actively maintaining long-term, low-visibility access inside U.S. critical infrastructure environments. Microsoft and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have documented campaigns attributed to Volt Typhoon, a PRC state-sponsored actor, in which intruders relied on valid credentials and built-in administrative tools rather than custom malware to evade detection across sectors. Using LOTL techniques and legitimate accounts, these actors embed within routine operations and persist where IT and OT visibility gaps exist. CISA Advisory AA24-038A warns that PRC state-sponsored actors are maintaining persistent access to U.S. critical infrastructure that could be activated during a future crisis. For security leaders, this represents sustained, deliberate positioning inside operational environments and underscores how adversaries shape conditions for future leverage.
 

Most of what Microsoft sees in our investigations is not sophisticated. It is preventable. Most intrusions into critical infrastructure begin with preventable exposure rather than advanced exploits. Internet-facing VPNs left enabled too long, contractor identities that outlive project timelines, misconfigured cloud tenants, and dormant privileged accounts create quiet, low-effort entry points. Microsoft research shows that 12% of intrusions originate from exposed remote services. Over time, configuration drift and unmanaged access expand the attack surface, allowing adversaries to gain initial access before persistence or lateral movement is required. Reducing unnecessary exposure remains one of the highest-leverage risk-reduction actions available to CI operators.
 

The goal has shifted. Attackers are no longer just trying to steal data. They are trying to take things offline. Operational disruption is becoming a primary objective, not a secondary outcome. Attack campaigns surged 87% in early 2025, alongside increased destructive cloud activity and hands-on-keyboard operations targeting critical infrastructure. Identity systems, cloud control planes, and remote management layers are targeted because they provide direct operational leverage. For CI operators, the impact extends beyond data loss to service availability and physical processes. Organizations must ensure operational pathways are resilient against disruptive activity, not only monitored for signs of compromise.