GlassWorm attack installs fake browser extension for surveillance
好的,我需要帮用户总结这篇文章的内容,控制在100字以内,而且不需要特定的开头。首先,我得通读全文,理解主要信息。 文章讲的是GlassWorm恶意软件通过开发者工具传播。它通过受信任的代码仓库如npm、GitHub等分发恶意包。一旦安装,它会窃取数据,安装远程访问木马,并伪装成浏览器扩展来监控活动。影响不仅限于开发者,还能扩散到供应链攻击,威胁企业和普通用户。 接下来,我需要提取关键点:恶意软件传播途径、窃取的数据类型、伪装成浏览器扩展、影响范围和防范建议。 然后,把这些点浓缩成简洁的句子,确保不超过100字。同时避免使用“这篇文章”这样的开头。 可能的结构:GlassWorm通过开发者工具传播,窃取数据并安装恶意软件,伪装扩展监控活动,影响范围广,需防范。 最后检查字数和表达是否清晰。 </think> GlassWorm恶意软件通过开发者工具传播,在感染后窃取数据并安装远程访问木马及伪装浏览器扩展以监控活动。其影响不仅限于开发者,还可能引发供应链攻击,威胁企业及用户安全。 2026-3-26 13:0:39 Author: www.malwarebytes.com(查看原文) 阅读量:4 收藏

GlassWorm hides inside developer tools. Once it’s in, it steals data, installs remote access malware, and even a fake browser extension to monitor activity. While it starts with developers, the impact can quickly spread. With stolen credentials, access tokens, and compromised tools, attackers can launch wider supply chain attacks, putting companies and everyday users at risk.

How the infection starts

GlassWorm is usually distributed through developer channels. That means that programmers get their systems compromised by downloading malicious packages from code repositories like npm, GitHub, PyPI, and so on. These can be new malicious packages or altered packages from once-trusted, but now compromised, accounts.

The developer installs or updates a trusted or popular npm/PyPI package or VS Code extension, but the maintainer’s account or supply chain has been compromised.

What happens after installation

Once the package is pulled, a preinstall script or invisible Unicode loader runs and fingerprints the machine. If it finds a Russian locale, execution stops. If not, the script waits a few hours and then quietly contacts the Solana blockchain to discover where to fetch stage two of the infection. Rather than hardcoding a link that could be taken down, the attacker stores this information in the memo field of a Solana transaction.

Stage two: Data theft

The stage two payload is an infostealer that targets browser extension profiles, standalone wallet apps, and .txt/image files likely holding seeds or keys, along with npm tokens, git credentials, VS Code secrets, and cloud provider credentials. After gathering this information, it sends it to a remote server via a POST request.

Stage three: Full system compromise

After that, it’s on to stage three. The malware fetches two main components: the Ledger/Trezor phishing binary aimed at users with a Ledger or Trezor device plugged in, and a Node.js Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with several modules, including browser credential stealers and a Chrome‑extension installer. It gains persistence by setting up scheduled tasks and Run registry keys so that the RAT comes back on every reboot.

How the malware stays hidden and connected

The RAT does not hardcode its main command and control (C2) address. Instead, it performs a distributed hash table (DHT) lookup for the pinned public key. DHT is a distributed system that provides a lookup service similar to a hash table. Key–value pairs are stored in a DHT and can be used to retrieve the value associated with a given key. If this method fails, the RAT goes back to the Solana blockchain to fetch a new IP address.

Browser surveillance and tracking

The RAT also force-installs a Chrome extension (in the example described by Aikido, it pretends to be “Google Docs Offline”), which acts as an onboard session surveillance. Besides stealing cookies, localStorage, the full Document Object Model (DOM) tree of the active tab, bookmarks, screenshots, keystrokes, clipboard content, up to 5,000 browser history entries, and the installed extensions list, it can also be used to take screenshots and act as a keylogger.

What this looks like to the victim

From the victim’s point of view, all this happens very stealthily. If they’re paying close attention, they may see a few suspicious outgoing connections, the startup entries, and the new browser extension.

Who’s at risk, and how this could spread

The current setup appears to focus on developers who may have cryptocurrency assets, but many of these components and the stolen information can be used to initiate supply chain attacks or target other groups of users.

How to stay safe

Because of the stealthy nature of this infection chain, there are two main strategies to stay safe:

  • Prefer known‑good, pinned versions, and treat sudden ownership changes, new maintainers, or big code rewrites in minor releases as review triggers.
  • Regularly audit browser extensions, remove anything you don’t recognize, and be suspicious of “Google Docs Offline”‑style clones or duplicates.
  • Check your scheduled tasks and registry startup locations for unexpected entries.
  • Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution to detect and block malicious connections and the downloaded malware.

IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)

IP addresses:

45.32.150[.]251

217.69.3[.]152

217.69.0[.]159

45.150.34[.]158

Malwarebytes blocks the IP address 45.32.150.251 used for stage 2 payload delivery, and the stage three WebSocket RAT
Malwarebytes blocks the IP address 45.32.150.251 used for stage 2 payload delivery, and the stage three WebSocket RAT

Registry keys:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\UpdateApp 

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\UpdateLedger

Scheduled Task:

Name: UpdateApp which runs: AghzgY.ps1

Browser extension:

Display name: Google Docs Offline (version 1.95.1)

Windows extension directory name :jucku

macOS extension directory name: myextension


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About the author

Was a Microsoft MVP in consumer security for 12 years running. Can speak four languages. Smells of rich mahogany and leather-bound books.


文章来源: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/03/glassworm-attack-installs-fake-browser-extension-for-surveillance
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