Breaking Down the Attack Surface of the Kenwood DNR1007XR – Part One
嗯,用户让我用中文总结一下这篇文章,控制在100字以内,而且不需要特定的开头。我得先仔细阅读文章内容,抓住重点。 文章主要讲的是Kenwood DNR1007XR这个车载娱乐系统在Pwn2Own Automotive竞赛中的情况。里面提到了硬件结构,比如主板、处理器、eMMC芯片、Wi-Fi/蓝牙模块,还有隐藏的调试接口。这些信息对安全研究人员来说很重要,可能用来寻找漏洞。 用户的需求是简洁的总结,所以我要提炼出关键点:设备型号、功能亮点、内部结构和安全研究的可能性。确保不超过100字,同时表达清晰。 最后,组织语言,确保流畅自然,不使用任何格式标记。 </think> 这篇文章介绍了Kenwood DNR1007XR车载娱乐系统在Pwn2Own Automotive竞赛中的情况,详细描述了其硬件结构、功能特点以及隐藏的调试接口,并为安全研究人员提供了进一步研究的方向。 2026-1-7 19:9:53 Author: www.thezdi.com(查看原文) 阅读量:2 收藏

For the upcoming Pwn2Own Automotive contest, a total of 3 head units have been selected. One of these is the double DIN Kenwood DNR1007XR that offers a variety of functionality such as Android Auto, Apple CarPlay, USB media playback, wireless mirroring and more.

This blog post presents photos of the DNR1007XR including highlighting interesting internal components. A hidden debugging interface is also detailed which can be leveraged to obtain a shell.

Figure 1: Kenwood DNR1007XR

External

Tucked away behind the screen is a full-sized SD card slot that can be accessed by tilting the screen downwards. The SD card is used to play audio/video files as well as updating map data. This seems like an attack surface worth researching.

There's also a single USB port routed from the back of the unit that is used for:

·      Wired Android Auto
·      Wired Apple CarPlay
·      Audio playback
·      Video playback

Internal

Moving on to the internals, the DNR1007XR comprises multiple interconnected boards, with the most interesting board being located at the top of the unit. Removing a few screws and metal plates gives access to this board, which contains the main processor, eMMC, flash, and a Bluetooth / WiFi radio module.

Towards the center is the main Dolphin+ TCC8034 System on a Chip (SoC), which is marketed as an “IVI and Cluster solution” that supports running Android, Linux, and QNX. The SoC contains two 32-bit ARM cores and is running Linux. Last year's Kenwood target utilized a similar TCC8974 SoC; more information can be found here.

Figure 4: Dolphin+ TCC8034 SoC

Further to the right is a Kioxia THGBMJG7C2LBAU8 16GB eMMC chip which contains the main device firmware.

Below the eMMC chip and to the left is a Winbond 25Q256JVFM 256Mb serial flash chip that contains unknown data.

Finally, to the left of the SoC is a Murata radio that handles Wi-Fi and Bluetooth operations. Searching around for the exact model number that's etched onto the radio's shielding doesn't return much information but the FCC documents for the DNR1007XR state that this is the Murata LBEE6ZZ1WD-334. This module has no public datasheet available and isn't listed on Murata's site.

Debug Connector

On the right edge of the main board is a suspicious-looking connector that lines up with a thin gap in the outer housing. This connector exposes a Linux login prompt over UART at 115200bps. Logging in with the correct credentials will spawn a shell.

Figure 8: Debug connector

Summary

Hopefully, this blog post provides enough information to kickstart vulnerability research against the DNR1007XR. Keep an eye out for another blog coming this Friday that covers the threat landscape of the DNR1007XR.

We are looking forward to Automotive Pwn2Own again in January 2026, and we will see if IVI vendors have improved their product security. We hope to see you there.

Until then, you can find me on Twitter @ByteInsight, and follow the team on Twitter, Mastodon, LinkedIn, or Bluesky for the latest in exploit techniques and security patches.


文章来源: https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/1/6/breaking-down-the-attack-surface-of-the-kenwood-dnr1007xr-part-one
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