Ever heard someone casually say, “OT is just IT with industrial devices”? I get the temptation—but it’s way off the mark. Moral of the story: OT isn’t your average office network—it’s mission-critical, physical, and way less forgiving. This kind of thinking can get systems broken, processes halted, or worse—someone hurt.
In the first blog, we learnt the foundations of Industrial, ICS, and Cyber-Physical Security.
This second blog in our OT Masterclass series is here to help you clearly see what makes OT different. If you’re a student, early-career engineer, or just someone curious about how factories stay secure, this one’s for you.
By the end of this blog, you’ll understand how Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) differ—not just in tools, but in philosophy. We’ll talk priorities, practices, risks, and real examples. You’ll also learn what happens when someone applies IT instincts to an OT system without considering how differently it behaves.
“IT and OT: Think of Them Like Cousins, Not Twins “
Imagine this: In an office, a new update rolls out for everyone’s email system. It’s tested, pushed at midnight, and everything’s back to normal by morning. Now, picture a bottling plant.
The touchscreen interface (called an HMI) that controls the conveyor line runs on a really old version of Windows. You want to update it? The vendor says the update might crash the software. There’s no backup. And that conveyor? It fills ₹40 lakh worth of product per day.
Would you still install that patch? That’s the difference.
This part is important. An IT security analyst might think in terms of logs, firewalls, or phishing attempts. An OT engineer thinks in cycles, sensors, control logic, and cause-effect chains.
Neither is it wrong. They’re just solving different problems with different tools.
⚠️ Same Threats, Different Consequences
The impact of cyber threats in IT vs OT environments isn’t just digital — it’s physical.
Threat Category
Viruses & Malware |
Ransomware Attacks |
Targeted Malware |
Denial of Service |
Code Injection/Fuzzing |
IT/Commercial Systems
• Data Loss • Financial Impact • Reputational Setback |
• Productivity Loss • System Downtime • Operational Disruption |
• Unauthorized Access • Privacy Breach |
• Temporary Downtime • Reduced Availability |
• Application Errors • Security Integrity Compromise |
OT/Industrial Systems
• Data Loss • Financial Impact • Reputation Damage 🔴 Risk to Human Life |
• Production Halt • Operational Paralysis 🔴 Potential Safety Threats |
• Loss of System Visibility 🔴 Loss of Equipment Control |
• Critical Service Disruption 🔴 Process Instability or Blind Spots |
• Equipment Behavior Anomalies 🔴 Potential for Physical Damage or Unsafe State |
🔴 Note: In OT environments, cyber incidents can affect human safety, production continuity, and compliance obligations—far beyond data loss.
In IT, we use HTTPS, SSH, SMB—most with encryption and strong user controls. In OT, you’ll hear about Modbus, DNP3, PROFINET, and others. Many of these were invented before cybersecurity was even a concern. They often send data in plain text. Some don’t even support passwords.
That doesn’t mean OT ignores security—it means you need to design protection around legacy systems, not inside them
Technology Areas | Information Technology | Operational Technology | |
Purpose | Managing Information, Automate Business Processes | Managing Assets, Controlling Technology Processes | |
Architecture | Transactional or Batch, RDBMS or Text | Event-Driven, Real-Time, Embedded Software, Rule Engines | |
Interfaces | Web Browser, Terminal and Keyboard | Sensors, Coded Displays | |
Ownership | CIO and Computer Grads, Finance, Procurement | Engineers, Technicians and Line Managers | |
Connectivity | Corporate Network, IP-Based | Control Networks (Increasingly IP-Based and Wireless) | |
Security | Availability | Delays, generally accepted | 24 x 7 x 365 |
Security Awareness | Good in both private & public sectors | Very poor, except for physical security | |
Security testing/Audit/Assessment | Scheduled & mandated | Occasional testing (for or after outage/incident) | |
Physical Security | Secure | Remote & unmanned | |
Application of Patches | Regular/scheduled | Slow (vendor-specific) | |
Support Technology Lifetime | 3 to 5 years | Up to 20+ years | |
Change Management | Regular/scheduled | Rare | |
Time Critical Content | Delays, generally accepted | Critical due to safety & ongoing production | |
Outsourcing | Common/widely used | Rarely used | |
Examples | ERP, SCM, CRM E-mail, EAM, Billing | SCADA, DCS, PLCs, Modeling, Control Systems |
💥 You just saw the theoretical differences? Cool. Now let me show you what happens when someone forgets them.
➡️ Lesson: Even standard patches can disable the lifeline of OT [1].
➡️ Lesson: What looks like threat prevention in IT can break trusted binaries in OT environments [1].
➡️ Lesson: OT devices don’t expect random traffic. Even a basic ping sweep can have kinetic consequences [1].
➡️ Lesson: Even benign discovery protocols can overwhelm fragile OT systems not designed for IT-style traffic [1].
➡️ Lesson: Domain-level security rules applied without OT coordination can lock out operational teams at critical moments [1].
⚠️ Thought Experiment: In June 2025, a faulty CrowdStrike update led to global outages of Windows systems. While no direct OT disruptions have been confirmed yet, imagine if an HMI, historian server, or engineering laptop used in an OT environment had the Falcon sensor installed and auto-rebooted. The loss of control, visibility, or programming access during a critical process could have had cascading physical effects. This event is a modern reminder of why IT-grade updates must be OT-tested. (Reference: CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor global incident, July 2024)
These days, OT systems aren’t staying isolated. Thanks to Industry 4.0 and IIoT, factories and plants are adding “smart” devices everywhere.
That sounds awesome—but it comes with new cybersecurity challenges:
Every new connection is a potential entry point. Especially when the tools weren’t designed for exposure [3][6].
Try This: Spot IT Thinking in OT Systems
Let’s do a quick reflective check. Imagine you manage a factory’s control room. Here are 3 real-life scenarios. For each one, decide:
Yes, this is IT thinking. Automatic updates may disrupt OT operations if critical files are quarantined or deleted, causing production halts and loss of visibility.
Yes. Unscheduled OS updates could reboot essential machines, risking downtime, lost production, or unsafe process states.
Yes. Strict policies designed for IT can lock out necessary maintenance tools in the middle of an operation, causing delays or blocked recovery in an emergency.
Now write one more scenario that you can imagine. Now ask: What could go wrong if this happened during production?
IT and OT serve different masters. IT protects data. OT protects operations.
You don’t need to choose a side—but you do need to understand what matters to each. That’s the only way to build systems that are both functional and secure [1][2].
[2] International Society of Automation (ISA), “ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards”
[4] Dragos, “TRISIS Malware: Targeting Safety Systems in Critical Infrastructure,” Dec. 2017
[5] ESET, “Industroyer: Biggest Threat to ICS Since Stuxnet,” Jun. 2017
[6] NIST, “Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS),” CPS Public Working Group
[7] Wikipedia, “2024 CrowdStrike-related IT outages.”
Next time, we’ll break down the major building blocks of OT systems—PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, SCADA, and DCS. You’ll learn what they do, how they’re attacked, and what it means for your future in OT security.
Catch you in Blog 3!