Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) is an enterprise endpoint management solution that allows for centralized management of devices within an organization. On May 24, 2024, ZDI and Ivanti released an advisory describing a SQL injection resulting in remote code execution with a CVSS score of 9.8. In this post we will detail the internal workings of this vulnerability. Our POC can be found here.
Luckily for us, the ZDI advisory told us exactly where to look for the SQL injection. A function named RecordGoodApp
. After installation, we find most of the application binaries in C:\Program Files\LANDesk
. Searching for RecordGoodApp
we find its present in a file named PatchBiz.dll
.
We can use JetBrains dotPeek tool to disassemble the PatchBiz.dll C# binary. From there we can search for the RecordGoodApp
method.
We can readily see that the first SQL statement in the function is potentially vulnerable to an SQL injection. They use string.Format
to insert the value of goodApp.md5
into the SQL query. Assuming we can find a way to influence the value of goodApp.md5
we should be able to trigger the SQL injection.
Next, we would like to see if there are any obvious paths to the RecordGoodApp
function that we can use to trigger the vulnerability. Luckily we can use dotPeek again to search for any references to RecordGoodApp
. However, to make sure we don’t miss anything, we first want to make sure that we have all potential application binaries loaded into dotPeek. If we don’t, we run the risk of missing a reference to the vulnerable function. We find that RecordGoodApp
is first called from AppMonitorAction.RecordPatchIssue
.
Continuing, we find the AppMonitorAction.RecordPatchIsssue
is called by Patch.UpdateActionHistory
We find that UpdateActionHistory
is called from three different locations.
This most interesting of these usages is StatusEvents.EventHandler.UpdateStatusEvents
. We find that it is annotated with [WebMethod]
in the EventHandler
class. EventHandler
inherits from System.Web.Services.WebService
. This strongly indicates that we should be able to hit UpdateStatusEvents
over HTTP.
Now that we have found a viable path to the vulnerable function, our attention turns to triggering the vulnerable function. First, using IIS Manager, we notice that EventHandler.cs
is hosted on the /WSStatusEvents
endpoint.
Navigating to the endpoint in a browser, we are led to a page that shows up some example requests and responses.
Now, we can copy these example requests into Burp Suite and begin modifying them to see if we can trigger the exploit. Using dyspy, we attach to the IIS process hosting the vulnerable endpoint and start sending requests. After a little bit more reversing, we come up with a fairly trivial request using xp_cmdshell
to gain RCE.
Finally, we see notepad.exe
running under sqlservr.exe
proving that our exploit worked!
The MS SQL logs can be examined for evidence of xp_cmdshell
being utilized to obtain command execution. Note that this is likely not the only method for gaining RCE, but it is a popular one.
NodeZero Attack Path utilizing CVE-2024-29824 to load a remote access tool and access files
Horizon3.ai clients and free-trial users alike can run a NodeZero operation to determine the exposure and exploitability of this issue.
The post CVE-2024-29824 Deep Dive: Ivanti EPM SQL Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability appeared first on Horizon3.ai.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Horizon3.ai authored by James Horseman. Read the original post at: https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/cve-2024-29824-deep-dive-ivanti-epm-sql-injection-remote-code-execution-vulnerability/