Date: October 15, 2025

Classification: TLP WHITE / STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Prepared by: Krypt3ia

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

This report provides an integrated geopolitical threat intelligence analysis of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) cyber operations against the United States, with a specific focus on SALT TYPHOON and affiliated state aligned cyber actors. Drawing from current and historical cyber activity, including the October 2025 exploitation of F5 Networks infrastructure and U.S. domestic cybersecurity policy shifts, this assessment evaluates China’s strategic objectives within a broader geopolitical framework, particularly its intent and capabilities regarding Taiwan, and maps these activities to foundational Chinese strategic doctrine.

The evidence confirms a long-term, methodical effort by the PRC to establish asymmetric pre-conflict leverage through persistent access to U.S. critical infrastructure and exploitation of internal vulnerabilities in U.S. cyber defense capacity. These activities align with Chinese national objectives to deter or delay U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan conflict and to precondition the geopolitical battlespace in ways consistent with classical Chinese military strategy, including the doctrines of Sun Tzu and modern PLA information warfare principles.

CHINA’S STRATEGIC CONTEXT

National Objectives and Taiwan

Taiwan remains the most geopolitically sensitive flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. The PRC has repeatedly declared reunification with Taiwan a “historical mission” and “core national interest.” The PRC’s strategic calculus assumes that U.S. military intervention is probable in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

Since 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accelerated its political, economic, and military preparations for a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In parallel, Chinese cyber operations, such as those conducted by SALT TYPHOON, indicate a strategic plan to offset conventional disadvantages by targeting the U.S. homeland’s digital and physical infrastructure to deter response or delay mobilization.

PLA and Cyber Domain Integration

China’s military doctrine incorporates “informatized warfare” and increasingly emphasizes “intelligentized operations,” where cyber, electronic, and information warfare capabilities are decisive tools for shaping adversary behavior. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) plays a central role in this strategy, responsible for cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. These capabilities are integrated into national strategic competition objectives and are operationalized through state-aligned threat actors such as SALT TYPHOON.

STRATEGIC CYBER OPERATIONS: SALT TYPHOON AND RELATED ACTORS

SALT TYPHOON Profile

• Affiliation: Assessed to operate under the direction of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) or PLA Strategic Support Force.
• Objectives: Strategic cyber espionage, long-term infrastructure prepositioning, and shaping operations.
• Tactics: Use of “living off the land” (LOTL) techniques, credential theft, lateral movement, and custom exploits with low attribution signatures.
• Targets: Telecommunications, energy, water, transportation, defense contractors, and government entities across U.S. infrastructure.

Operational Timeline and Geopolitical Relevance (2023–2025)

Date	Event	Sector Targeted	Geopolitical Context
May 2023	Guam telecom infrastructure accessed	Military communications	Indo-Pacific command & control surveillance
Apr 2024	Water utilities in U.S. Midwest compromised	Civil infrastructure	Prepositioning for civilian disruption in homeland during conflict
Jul 2025	Energy grid access via SCADA vulnerabilities	Energy infrastructure	Establishing latent disruption capacity ahead of a Taiwan contingency
Oct 2025	F5 BIG-IP zero-days exploited	Cross-sector enterprise	Coincides with Taiwan National Day; direct escalation signaling

GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OCTOBER 2025 F5 INCIDENT

Event Summary

On October 15, 2025, F5 Networks disclosed five actively exploited zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-39301 to CVE-2025-39305) affecting its BIG-IP and BIG-IQ products. These vulnerabilities were exploited by a nation-state-aligned threat actor with tradecraft consistent with SALT TYPHOON. Affected systems span U.S. defense, government, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Exploitation included credential harvesting, stealth lateral movement, and backdoor persistence without traditional malware.

Timing and Geopolitical Framing

The incident occurred days after Taiwan’s National Day (October 10), an event marked by independence rhetoric and met with sharp PRC condemnation. The coordinated timing suggests the exploitation was strategic in nature, intended to demonstrate latent capabilities and erode U.S. confidence in infrastructure resilience and crisis readiness.

This type of signaling aligns with PLA doctrine favoring covert shaping and psychological disruption, serving both as a deterrence mechanism and a preparatory move should a Taiwan conflict emerge.

DOMESTIC CYBERSECURITY FRAGILITY AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

CISA Workforce Reduction and Institutional Weakening

In Q3 2025, the Trump administration initiated a budgetary and organizational restructuring of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This included proposed cuts to staffing (estimated 35–40%), suspension of certain regional coordination programs, and reduced grants for state-level cybersecurity readiness.

The rationale was political, citing overreach, bureaucratic redundancy, and emphasis on private sector-led security. However, this decision introduced significant gaps in federal cyber coordination and incident response capability at a time when China was expanding its offensive cyber posture.

Strategic Consequences and Chinese Exploitation

From a geopolitical threat perspective, China is highly likely to interpret U.S. reductions in cyber defense infrastructure as strategic opportunity. Based on PLA writings on “opportunity warfare” (机遇战), adversary political disarray and bureaucratic paralysis are ideal conditions for:

• Increasing cyber infiltration campaigns (e.g., SALT TYPHOON expanding access across under-monitored sectors).
• Launching parallel information operations targeting public trust and allied confidence in U.S. resilience.
• Widening asymmetric gaps through exploitation of edge systems (e.g., F5, Fortinet, and Citrix appliances) often neglected during institutional transitions.

This internal degradation in U.S. cyber capacity, when paired with Chinese strategic intent, increases both the probability and potential success of coordinated infrastructure disruptions during geopolitical escalation involving Taiwan.

Strategic Amplification – Risk Matrix

Risk Category	Impact from CISA Reduction	Chinese Exploitation Vector
Federal-private coordination	Reduced speed and coherence of incident response	Exploit time gap to escalate undetected access
Attribution and deterrence	Weakened capability to identify and respond to nation-state activity	Operate below attribution threshold
Sectoral readiness (water, energy)	Increased gaps in regional defenses	Focus on decentralized/under-resourced critical infrastructure
International perception	U.S. viewed as unreliable cybersecurity partner	Undermine allied alignment and Taiwan defense cooperation

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: APPLICATION OF SUN TZU

China’s cyber strategy reflects classical military principles derived from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, which remain central to PLA strategic education. The PLA explicitly emphasizes the use of cyber to achieve victory through preparation, deception, and disruption, not necessarily combat.

Sun Tzu Tenet	Application in PRC Cyber Strategy
“All warfare is based on deception.”	Use of LOTL, false flag TTPs, obfuscation of attribution
“Know the enemy and know yourself.”	Long-term presence inside U.S. infrastructure
“Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”	Infrastructure control as coercive leverage
“Attack where he is unprepared.”	Focus on edge infrastructure and underfunded sectors
“In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.”	Exploiting U.S. internal cyber governance instability (CISA cuts)

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS: TAIWAN CONTINGENCY

Pre-Conflict Shaping Operations

PRC cyber operations, especially those attributed to SALT TYPHOON, are best understood as part of Phase 0 shaping campaigns, preparing the digital battlespace prior to kinetic conflict. These campaigns are designed to:

• Disrupt U.S. power projection through critical infrastructure compromise (logistics, communications).
• Generate domestic pressure through controlled disruptions (energy, water, emergency response systems).
• Undermine public trust and federal credibility during crisis escalation.
• Deter allied engagement by demonstrating U.S. cyber vulnerability.

Strategic Calculus

If the PRC believes the United States lacks the internal resilience, due to cyber readiness degradation (e.g., CISA cuts), to respond effectively to a Taiwan contingency, it may assess the risk of military escalation as acceptable or manageable. Conversely, the ability to silently degrade U.S. capacity serves as a non-kinetic deterrent to delay or avoid U.S. intervention.

FORECAST SCENARIOS

Scenario	Chinese Cyber Activity	Strategic Objective
Taiwan invasion with U.S. response	Activate latent access to disrupt U.S. infrastructure	Delay or deny force deployment; induce internal pressure
Taiwan blockade	Deploy cyber pressure on Taiwan and regional allies	Achieve political concessions without direct conflict
U.S. internal cyber instability	Exploit institutional gaps (e.g., weakened CISA)	Expand infiltration, test red lines, degrade deterrence credibility

POLICY AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE OPTIONS

1. Reinforce National Cyber Readiness
   • Restore full funding and workforce capacity at CISA.
   • Create a national cyber reserve force for surge support.
2. Rebuild Deterrence Messaging
   • Issue formal declaratory policies tying cyber prepositioning to strategic red lines.
   • Conduct joint U.S.-allied infrastructure defense exercises.
3. Secure Edge Infrastructure
   • Mandate rapid patching and third-party security validation for appliances (e.g., F5, Fortinet).
   • Enforce zero-trust and segmentation standards across federal and critical sectors.
4. Global Cybersecurity Diplomacy
   • Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cyber threat sharing with Indo-Pacific allies.
   • Promote collective attribution mechanisms for state-sponsored campaigns.

CONCLUSION

Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations against U.S. infrastructure, exemplified by SALT TYPHOON’s long-term infiltration campaigns and the exploitation of F5 vulnerabilities in October 2025, reflect a deliberate strategy of pre-conflict shaping and geopolitical coercion. When paired with the reduction of U.S. federal cyber defense capability, particularly the weakening of CISA, this strategy becomes increasingly potent.

These actions are not isolated technical threats. They constitute a broader effort by the PRC to establish asymmetric control over critical infrastructure, reduce U.S. will to intervene in defense of Taiwan, and reshape strategic decision-making during crisis escalation. U.S. policymakers must treat domestic cyber readiness not only as a technical imperative but as a pillar of national security with direct implications for deterrence, alliance credibility, and great power competition.

Linked Primary Sources

F5 8K report:

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1048695/000104869525000149/ffiv-20251015.htm

https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000154696

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Report – Volt Typhoon (SALT TYPHOON)

Volt Typhoon: State-sponsored actor from China targeting critical infrastructure

CISA Alerts Related to SALT TYPHOON and Infrastructure Threats

CISA Alert AA23-144A: PRC State-Sponsored Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection

CISA Alert AA24-102A: PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Activity Targeting Infrastructure

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Annual Reports on PRC Military Capabilities

2023 Report: Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC (PDF)

The 2024 report is pending release. Check DoD’s China Military Power site: https://www.defense.gov/CMPR/

PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) – Public Analysis

RAND Report: China’s Strategic Support Force and the Future of PLA Information Operations

Commercial Threat Intelligence Reporting (Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Recorded Future)

Mandiant – Blog on China Cyber Operations
(For APT41, APT40, and MSS-aligned threat groups.)

CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2024
(2025 version expected in Q1 2026.)

Recorded Future – China Cyber Threat Intelligence

PLA Interpretations of Sun Tzu / Strategic Military Theory

Direct PLA interpretations are not publicly distributed. However, PLA strategic thinking is reflected in U.S. and Western military academic analysis:

The Science of Military Strategy – PLA National Defense University (NDU Press summary)
(Unofficial English-language assessments of PLA doctrine.)

China Military Power Report (DoD analysis of PLA strategy)

End of Report
Prepared for strategic-level consumers across defense, intelligence, and allied national security organizations.