Hacking Trains
文章指出,用于列车通信的End-of-Train和Head-of-Train设备因缺乏加密和认证机制存在安全隐患。这些1980年代安装的设备通过简单校验传输数据,CISA警告称攻击者可能利用软件定义无线电发送虚假数据包干扰列车运行。 2025-7-16 16:57:16 Author: www.schneier.com(查看原文) 阅读量:15 收藏

Hacking Trains

Seems like an old system system that predates any care about security:

The flaw has to do with the protocol used in a train system known as the End-of-Train and Head-of-Train. A Flashing Rear End Device (FRED), also known as an End-of-Train (EOT) device, is attached to the back of a train and sends data via radio signals to a corresponding device in the locomotive called the Head-of-Train (HOT). Commands can also be sent to the FRED to apply the brakes at the rear of the train.

These devices were first installed in the 1980s as a replacement for caboose cars, and unfortunately, they lack encryption and authentication protocols. Instead, the current system uses data packets sent between the front and back of a train that include a simple BCH checksum to detect errors or interference. But now, the CISA is warning that someone using a software-defined radio could potentially send fake data packets and interfere with train operations.

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Posted on July 16, 2025 at 12:57 PM3 Comments

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