May 21, 2025 6 Minute Read

Modern cloud ecosystems often place a single identity provider in charge of handling logins and tokens for a wide range of customers.

This approach certainly streamlines single sign-on (SSO) for end users, but it also places enormous trust in a single set of signing keys. If those private keys are compromised, attackers can create tokens that appear valid to any service that relies on them. Storm-0558 is a prime example of how this can backfire, because a key that was intended for one context ended up creating tokens accepted in a different environment, bypassing every normal safeguard.

How Storm-0558 Happened

In the Storm-0558 incident, a signing key intended for Microsoft consumer accounts ended up in the wrong hands. That same key was then used to issue tokens for enterprise Azure AD services. Azure AD did not differentiate consumer keys from enterprise keys, so the forged tokens were given access to resources such as Outlook Web Access. Rather than being contained, a single stolen key became a universal pass across multiple tenants, which is a worst-case outcome for multi-tenant services.

Typically, tokens such as OAuth or OpenID Connect rely on cryptographic signatures to confirm the issuer. A resource server checks the signature against the public key from the identity provider, and if it matches, the token is trusted. However, if the provider fails to retire or strictly isolate keys, one breached key can be used to sign tokens for any user.

That is exactly what occurred with Storm-0558. The attacker adjusted claims (for example, sub or tid) to choose a particular account or tenant, then signed the token with the compromised key. Since Azure AD did not reject that key, the forgeries appeared legitimate, granting full access to email systems, user data, and more.

Though this event targeted Microsoft, the underlying issue is not exclusive to Azure AD. Anyone who acquires a private key from an OAuth or OIDC deployment can forge tokens with arbitrary claims, unless the application enforces correct checks on the issuer, audience, and tenant. If those checks are missing, a token meant for tenant A might be accepted by tenant B. Similar trouble can arise in open-source solutions, including Keycloak, where each realm has its own key. Once that key is stolen, an attacker can impersonate any user in that realm. Some multi-tenant environments even share a single JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) or key set across many tenants, making one compromised key an easy entry point for multiple realms. Without logs tying each token to a particular tenant or issuer, these attacks can go undetected.

Attackers use a variety of methods to obtain or misuse keys. They might capture them from memory dumps or guess them if they are weak Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) secrets. Once they have a valid key, they can sign tokens indefinitely, adjusting claims to escalate privileges. Attackers may also manipulate the token structure by switching alg to none if the system fails to block that, or by changing the kid field to load a key from a file path they control. JKU injection is another trick, pointing the server to a malicious URL to fetch a matching public key. The attacker can also set an unusually long exp value, adjust aud to reuse a token for a different purpose, or add claims that label a token as an admin.

Similar incidents have arisen elsewhere. During the SolarWinds hack, attackers stole a SAML signing certificate from an ADFS server, letting them generate valid tokens for Microsoft 365. OAuth audience confusion has caused tokens created for one service to be improperly accepted by another. Researchers have discovered JWT libraries that allowed alg=none or confused RS256 with HS256, letting a public key act like a shared secret. Some identity providers neglect to retire outdated keys or skip checks on iss and aud, letting tokens cross boundaries they never should.

Practical Steps to Protect Against Token Forgery

The good news is that Storm-0558 and similar breaches highlight actionable steps for defending your environment against forged tokens. Below are concrete methods and example configurations that you can adapt.

1. Strong Key Management and Rotation

A single compromised signing key opens the door to forging tokens for any user in your environment. Storing those keys in unsecured locations, such as a file system or code repository, increases the risk of accidental leakage or targeted theft.

How to Implement

• Use a Dedicated Secrets Manager or a Hardware Security Module (HSM)
  • Tools such as HashiCorp Vault, AWS KMS, or Azure Key Vault encrypt keys at rest and in transit, controlling who can sign with them.
  • In on-prem environments, HSMs such as Thales or YubiHSM provide a physical barrier that keeps private keys off standard servers.
•  Automate Key Rotation
  • Set a rotation interval (for example, every 90 days or 6 months).
  • When rotating, issue a new key in the vault, publish its public key to your JWKS, and mark the old key as retired.
  • After a short overlap (so older tokens can expire), remove the old key entirely.
• Fully Retire Old Keys
  • Double-check downstream services or caches, making sure no part of your environment still accepts a retired key.
  • In multi-tenant systems, confirm each tenant has updated its references to the JWKS.

Nginx Example:

# Example: AWS KMS Key Rotation in Terraform
resource "aws_kms_key" "app_signing_key" {
  description = "KMS key for signing application tokens"
  enable_key_rotation = true
  # ...
}

This config uses AWS KMS built-in rotation and ensures only certain roles can sign with this key.

2. Comprehensive Token Validation

A valid signature alone is not enough. Attackers can reuse tokens across different tenants or resources if you fail to check crucial claims like iss, aud, or tid.

How to Implement

• Verify the Issuer (iss)
  • Maintain an allowlist of issuer URIs that match your tenants or trusted identity providers.
  • In multi-tenant scenarios, derive which issuer is acceptable based on the domain or path.
• Check the Audience (aud)
  • The token’s audience should match your resource server’s identifier. If your service is named my-api, then reject tokens that lack aud=my-api.
• Enforce Tenant Specific Logic
  • Tokens often include a tid (tenant ID). If a token for tenant A appears in tenant B’s environment, deny it.
• Whitelist Algorithms
  • Configure your JWT library to only accept RS256 or ES256, for example. Disallow alg=none or HS256 if they are not in use.

JS Sample:

const jwt = require("jsonwebtoken");

function validateToken(token, expectedAudience, allowedIssuers, publicKey) {
 const options = {
  audience: expectedAudience,
  issuer: allowedIssuers,
  algorithms: ["RS256", "ES256"]
};

const decoded = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, options);

if (decoded.tid && decoded.tid !== "expected-tenant-id") {
  throw new Error("Invalid tenant");
}

  return decoded;
}

This verifies the audience, issuer, and allowed algorithms, as well as checks for a valid tenant ID.

3. Logging and Monitoring for Suspicious Tokens

If you do not track which key or issuer was used to validate a token, forged tokens might go unnoticed. Proper logging lets you spot red flags quickly.

How to Implement

• Capture Key Metadata
  • Log the kid, iss, aud, sub, tid, and roles or claims for every incoming token.
• Forward to a SIEM
  • Tools like Splunk, Elastic, or Sumo Logic can raise alerts when they detect tokens signed by an unknown key, tokens with mismatched tenant IDs, or suspicious location data.
• Correlate With Geo IP
  • If tokens for a single user suddenly come from different countries in a short timeframe, investigate.

Example Log Output:

{
  "event": "token_validation",
  "timestamp": "2025-01-01T12:00:00Z",
  "kid": "abc123",
  "iss": "https://login.example.com",
  "sub": "user123",
  "aud": "my-api",
  "tid": "tenantA",
  "roles": ["user"]
}

Having structured logs like this in JSON makes it easier for your SIEM to parse and act on anomalies.

4. Testing for Common JWT Flaws

Attackers routinely exploit known JWT weaknesses such as alg=none or confusion between HS256 and RS256. If your app or library is poorly configured, it may accept tokens that are not genuinely signed.

How to Implement

• Penetration Testing Tools
  • Use Burp Suite’s JWT Editor extension to test manipulations of alg, kid, or jku.
  • OWASP ZAP can be scripted to probe JWT endpoints.
• Automated CI Checks
  • Integrate security tests in your CI/CD pipeline with tools such as OpenID Security Test Suite or jwt-tool.
  • Check negative scenarios by sending tokens with alg=none or flipping RSA to HMAC in the header.
• Custom Scripts
  • Write scripts (Python, Node, etc.) that build deliberately invalid tokens. Then confirm your server rejects them.

Example Python Script:

import jwt
import requestsdef test_alg_none(url):
  headers = {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"}
  payload = {"sub": "admin", "iat": 1690846103}
  token = jwt.encode(payload, None, algorithm=None, headers=headers)
  resp = requests.get(url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
  print("alg=none test:", resp.status_code, resp.text)

If the response indicates success, you have a problem.

5. Separating Environments, Tenants, and Keys

Storm-0558 showed how a key for consumer use was accepted in enterprise contexts. Whenever you use a single-identity provider for multiple tenants, you should ensure each tenant is isolated at the key level.

How to Implement

• Unique Key Sets
  • In Keycloak or similar systems, do not reuse the same realm key for multiple tenants.
  • Publish separate JWKS endpoints for each realm and make resource servers validate tokens against the matching realm’s issuer.
• No Shared JWKS for Production and Staging
  • If staging shares production keys, a breach in staging compromises production too.
• Map Issuer to Tenant
  • Each tenant should have a unique issuer URL. A token from tenantB’s issuer is invalid in tenantA’s domain.

Keycloak Configuration Example:

spring:
 security:
  oauth2:
   resourceserver:
    jwt:
          issuer-uri: "https://id.example.com/realms/tenantA"

This makes sure tokens only come from tenantA’s realm.

6. Handling Incidents and Rapid Response

Even the best setups can face breaches. You need a plan if a key leaks or forged tokens are found in the wild.

How to Implement

• Immediate Key Revocation
  • Disable the compromised key in your vault or HSM.
  • Remove that key from the JWKS.
  • Refresh any caching layers or validation services.
• Force Token Expiration
  • Keep tokens short lived (e.g., 5 to 15 minutes).
  • Revoke refresh tokens so attackers cannot get new tokens.
• Investigate the Root Cause
  • See if the key was stored in plain text, leaked in logs, or left in a code repo.
  • Fix the core problem and monitor your logs for more suspicious tokens.
• Notify Stakeholders
  • If you host multiple tenants, alert all affected clients.
  • Advise them to rotate any credentials that might be compromised.

Conclusions

Storm-0558 is a cautionary tale of what happens when a single signing key crosses boundaries it was never designed for. Many identity solutions will trust any key they have not explicitly blocked, so if a key from one environment appears in another, it can lead to serious breaches. The best defense is to secure keys in a vault or HSM, enforce strict validation rules for each issuer and tenant, log all token data to spot anomalies, and test for well-known JWT pitfalls such as alg=none or HS256 vs RS256 confusion. Ensure that each realm or tenant uses its own key sets and have a plan to revoke keys quickly if they are compromised.

By following these steps, you greatly reduce the odds that one stolen key can bring down your entire identity framework.